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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Prior Restraint Enforced Against Publication of
Classified Material by CIA Employee
The "right to know" is in a period of gestation. . . . [P]eople will
increasingly insist upon knowing what their government is doing and
* , * because this knowledge is vital to government by the people, the
"right to know" will grow.'
The public's "right to know" is dependent upon the free exercise
of the first amendment freedoms of speech and press. This right seem-
ingly received strong reaffirmance in New York Times Co. v. United
States,2 when the Supreme Court dissolved a preliminary injunction
which had prohibited the New York Times and Washington Post from
publishing excerpts from a classified Pentagon study of United States
policy decisions in Vietnam. However, the scope of the Pentagon Papers
case has recently been narrowed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Marchetti,3 in which the court affirmed the
issuance of an injunction enforcing a secrecy agreement which had been
exacted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from an employee as
a condition of employment. 4
Before Victor Marchetti began working for the CIA in 1955 he was
required to sign a secrecy agreement in which he promised not to divulge
any classified information, intelligence, or knowledge concerning the
present and future security of the United States, except in the perform-
ance of his official duties, unless specifically authorized in writing by the
CIA Director or his authorized representative.' After his resignation in
1969 Marchetti published a novel and a magazine article critical of some
policies and practices of the CIA.' In March of 1972 he submitted to
Esquire magazine and six other publishers an article in which he related
some of his experiences as an agent. 7
'United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (4th Cir.) (Craven, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 93 S. Ct. 553 (1972).
2403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). This case is commonly known and will hereinafter be
referred to as the Pentagon Papers case.
3466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
'Id. at 1311-12.
'Id. at 1312.
1id. at 1313.
71d.
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After learning of this, the United States, alleging that the article
contained classified information concerning intelligence sources, meth-
ods, and operations, sought an injunction to enforce the secrecy agree-
ment.8 The district court granted the injunction and ordered Marchetti
to submit all writings to the CIA Director for prior approval and not
to release, without prior Agency approval, any writing relating to the
Agency or to intelligence.' The Fourth Circuit upheld the substance of
the district court decree but limited the requirement of prior approval
to the release of classified material.'0 The decision further provided that
the CIA must respond within thirty days after submission of material
for approval and that Marchetti would be entitled to judicial review of
any CIA denial of publication approval." However, the burden of ob-
taining such review would be on Marchetti. The issues on review would
be limited to whether or not the information were classified, and if so,
whether or not it had previously been disclosed to the public.'
Any consideration of the doctrine of prior restraint 3 should begin
with Near v. Minnesota,4 the landmark case in this area. Near involved
a statute which provided for the "abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical.' "15 Whenever such nuisance existed, an appropriate public
official, or a citizen if such official took no action, could maintain an
action to perpetually enjoin the persons committing the nuisance from
further maintaining it." In declaring the statute unconstitutional the
Supreme Court held that the chief purpose of the first amendment
guarantee is to prevent prior restraints upon publication, and that while
such protection is not "absolutely unlimited," limitations have been
recognized only in "exceptional cases."' 7
1d. at 1311, 1313.
'Id. at 1311.
"Id. at 1311, 1318.
"Id. at 1317.
"Id. at 1317-18. Judge Craven concurred in the court's decision, but disagreed that the scope
of judicial review should be so limited, preferring not to foreclose inquiry into whether or not
secrecy classifications are reasonable. Id. at 1318-19.
'-The doctrine of prior restraint has been defined as holding that the first amendment prohib-
its governments from imposing any system of prior restraint, with certain limited exceptions, in
any area of expression within the boundaries of the amendment. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
14283 U.S. 697 (1931).
111d. at 701-02.
"Id. at 702-03.
"I1d. at 713, 716. "Exceptional cases" mentioned by the Court included enforcements against
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The Court in Near was highly suspicious of any restraint that
would eliminate or decrease criticism of public officials. 8 This concern
has broadened, and the doctrine of prior restraint has been applied to
subsequent cases involving licensing statutes that have required the ac-
quisition of a permit from a public official prior to the exercise of first
amendment rights. Fearing arbitrary denials of licenses by officials who
might base their decisions on the content of the intended expression, the
Court has overturned statutes and ordinances which have not contained
adequate guidelines for implementation. On the other hand, the Court
has upheld narrowly drawn statutes with explicit standards based upon
the time, place, and manner of the intended expression.
20
Similarly, prior restraints in the area of obscenity have been scruti-
nized in order to avoid suppression of expression protected by the first
amendmentY.2 In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown2 1 the Court upheld a
statute which authorized a municipality to enjoin the sale and distribu-
tion of written and printed material that had been found at a trial to be
obscene. This case was distinguished from Near because the statute was
directed solely at obscenity and imposed no restraint upon materials not
already published and found to be obscene. 23
Censorship of motion pictures has presented its own unique prob-
lems. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago24 the Court refused to
establish a general rule that movie censorship statutes are unconstitu-
tional per se, and said: "It has never been held that liberty of speech is
absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech
obscene publications, government actions to prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting services
or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops, and
government actions to protect against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force
of orderly government. Id. at 716.
18d. at 710, 713.
"E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (use of sound amplification devices); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distribution of religious literature).
2 E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (parade permits).
"In light of the definition of the doctrine of prior restraint in note 13 supra, it may at first
seem meaningless to discuss prior restraint in relation to obscenity, which is unprotected by the
first amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). However, because of the Fourth
Circuit's reliance in Marchetti upon a movie censorship case in establishing safeguards, 466 F.2d
at 1317, such discussion can be helpful. Besides, if one adheres to the "absolutist" first amendment
philosophy, obscenity deserves as much protection as anything else. Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 61-62 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
n354 U.S. 436 (1957).
1id. at 445.
2365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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are invalid. '2 5 Subsequently, in Freedman v. Maryland,2 however, par-
ticular features of a Maryland statute were challenged. There the Court
found the prior restraint invalid because the absence of appropriate
procedural safeguards produced a danger of undue suppression of pro-
tected as well as unprotected expressionY.2
The history of prior restraint consists primarily of statutory enact-
ments that have infringed upon first amendment rights. Unprecedented,
therefore, was the government's attempt in the Pentagon Papers case
to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publish-
ing the contents of a classified study of United States policy decisions
in Vietnam.2 On the surface, at least, the decision in that case seemed
to give the doctrine of prior restraint its greatest impetus in forty years.
The Supreme Court, in denying the injunction, ruled that "[any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity" and that the United
States had failed to carry its burden of showing justification for such
restraint.29 There were, however, six concurring and three dissenting
opinions, and the exact legal principles of the decision are difficult to
determine.30
Although the competing interests of governmental secrecy and first
amendment freedoms were very similar in Marchetti and the Pentagon
Papers case, the respective courts reached opposite conclusions. In the
Pentagon Papers case there was no explicit statement as to why the
government had failed to overcome the presumption against prior re-
straints, and the injunction was denied. In Marchetti no explicit state-
ment can be found as to how the government met its heavy burden, yet
the injunction was granted.
The Fourth Circuit relied upon three major factors in implicitly
establishing that the presumption against prior restraint had been over-
come. First, the court found that the Constitution,'3 Supreme Court
21fd. at 47.
26380 U.S. 51 (1965).
21d. at 60. The procedural safeguards required by the Court to accompany a system of prior
submission to a censor included (1) placing the burden of proving the film is obscene on the censor,
(2) assuring the right to a final judicial determination on the merits, and (3) prompt judicial review.
Id. at 58-59.
21403 U.S. at 714.
29Id.
'Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1971).
3 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
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decisions," and history33 have clearly established the government's
right to "internal secrecy about the conduct of governmental affairs in
areas in which disclosure may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent
with the national interest."34 The court correctly noted that nothing in
the Constitution requires the government to divulge information. The
historical development of the use of "executive privilege" in refusing to
disclose information to Congress can be justified on a separation-of-
powers theory.35 However, this theory collides with the view that sover-
eignty resides in the people, and that government may interfere with the
people's "right to know" only when they consent, and that presidential
power to withhold information from the public is truly a narrowly lim-
ited "privilege" and not a right.3
Secondly, the court considered the nature of the material Marchetti
sought to disclose and determined that although "ordinary criminal
sanctions might suffice to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such infor-
mation . ..the risk of harm from disclosure is so great and mainte-
nance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary that greater
and more positive assurance is warranted." 37 In the Pentagon Papers
case the government also argued that it had a right to secrecy and that
disclosure of the information would be harmful.38 Perhaps a distinction
between the two cases can be found in the nature of the classified materi-
als involved. In the Pentagon Papers case the information concerned a
war which was a major national issue. The Supreme Court, therefore,
may have felt especially compelled to allow such information to flow
freely to the public. The Fourth Circuit may not have felt this same
12E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936). There the
Court recognized the paramount role of the President in foreign affairs and the need for secrecy
in regard to information gathered by the President's "confidential sources." But the Court also
said that this executive power, like every other governmental power, "must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.' Id. at 320.
3466 F.2d at 1316. In enacting the Freedom of Information Act Congress recognized the
need for secrecy and provided that "[t]his section does not apply to matters that are-(l) specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy ... " 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1972), established
the classification system that is currently in use.
3"466 F.2d at 1315.
"See Kutner, Freedom of Information: Due Process of the Right to Know, 18 CATHOLIC
LAW. 50, 52 (1972).
USee Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 668-70,
770 (1959).
3466 F.2d at 1317 (emphasis added).
3403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sense of urgency in regard to Marchetti's material. Also, the Pentagon
study covered decisions only up to the year 1968, while the classified
materials in Marchetti, if the secrecy agreement is taken literally, con-
cerned the "present and future security of the United States." 9
The chief distinction between the two cases, however, probably lies
in the court's third factor, the "position of trust and confidence" in
which the government placed Marchetti."° "Confidentiality inheres in
the situation and the relationship of the parties. Since information
highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the national defense
was involved, the law would probably [have implied] a secrecy agree-
ment had there been no formally expressed agreement . "..."I' In the
Pentagon Papers case there was no confidential relationship between the
government and the newspapers involved. Had there been no such rela-
tionship in Marchetti, there is language in the Fourth Circuit's opinion
which indicates that the injunction would not have been affirmed:
"Moreover, the Government's need for secrecy in this area lends justifi-
cation to a system of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and
former employees of classified information obtained during the course
of employment."42
The combination of these three factors enabled the government to
overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of its
system of prior restraint. In balancing the governmental interest against
the first amendment rights involved, however, the court had to consider
whether a sufficient nexus existed between the secrecy interest and the
means by which the government sought to protect that interest. The
court found that it is reasonable for government agencies to protect
internal secrets through secrecy agreements with employes.43 Some
support and authority for this view can be found in Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers case.44 He felt that since the
President has the power to conduct foreign affairs and to maintain the
national defense, his responsibility is to insure that the confidentiality
necessary to carry out his duties receives protection.
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not base its determination that
this system of prior restraint is reasonable solely on the President's
'466 F.2d at 1312 n.l.
411d. at 1313.
4 Id. at 1316.
421d. at 1316-17 (emphasis added).
4 d. at 1316.
U403 U.S. at 729-30.
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inherent powers to preserve vital secrecy. The court said that "Congress
has imposed on the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility
for protecting intelligence sources and methods."45 Secrecy agreements
as a condition of employment are "entirely appropriate to a program
in implementation of the congressional direction of secrecy."46 Accord-
ing to Justice White's concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers case,
an express congressional mandate would seem to be necessary: "[T]he
United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet
to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in
the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authori-
zation for prior restraints in circumstances such as these. '47
Apparently the Fourth Circuit was satisfied that congressional au-
thorization plus inherent executive power had combined to enable the
government reasonably to require a prospective CIA employee to waive
his first amendment rights. This sanction given to the employment con-
tract may be usefully compared to the old and generally discredited
right-privilege distinction." The old notion was that government em-
ployment or the conferral of a government benefit was a privilege which
the government could take away without affording any procedural due
process. It has since been established that the termination of govern-
ment employment cannot be based upon an exercise of first amendment
rights by the employee. 9 Therefore, it seems arguable that the initial
grant of government employment cannot be based on the surrender of
first amendment rights.
The court insisted, however, that Marchetti, in signing a secrecy
agreement, did not surrender his first amendment right of free speech.50
"The agreement is enforceable only because it is not a violation of those
rights."'" Taken out of context, this statement could be interpreted as
meaning that there is no first amendment right to speak about material
which the government has designated as classified. But in the context
"1466 F.2d at 1316. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1970) reads: "IT]he Director of Central Intellig-
ence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclo-
sure . ...
4466 F.2d at 1316.
47403 U.S. at 731.
"
6For a good analysis of the distinction and its constitutional implications, see Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
"E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
1466 F.2d at 1317.
51Id.
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of the entire decision and in light of Justice Brennan's analysis of the
nature of the classified material in the Pentagon Papers case,," the court
seems to have held that it is not a violation of a person's first amend-
ment rights to require that person to waive such rights as a condition
of government employment when disclosure of the information to which
the employee is exposed "may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent
with the national interest."53
In order to insure that the prohibition on expression is kept to a
minimum the court provided several safeguards. Feeling that undue
delay would impair the reasonableness of the restraint, the court set
thirty days as the maximum period in which the CIA should respond
after submission of material for approval. 4 The court further provided
that Marchetti, on his own initiative, could obtain judicial review of any
CIA action disapproving publication.5 5 It is certainly arguable that these
safeguards are inadequate. The CIA needs only to indicate whether or
not material submitted by Marchetti is classified. A few days would be
more than a reasonable amount of time in which to make such a deter-
mination. And though judicial review may be obtained, there are no set
time limits within which a decision must be handed down.
These inadequacies, however, are insubstantial when compared to
the limitations placed by the court upon the scope of judicial review.
"The issues upon judicial review would seem to be simply whether or
not the information was classified and, if so, whether or not, by prior
disclosure, it had come into the public domain."5 By imposing this
narrow restriction upon the scope of review, the court has foreclosed any
determination of whether such restraints prohibit the free and robust
discussion of public issues and personalities which is necessary to the
proper exercise of the people's function in the democratic process."
Since the court will look no further than the classified stamp on
the cover, material which may be merely embarrassing to a public offi-
5 Justice Brennan said that unlike obscene material, there was no question that the Pentagon
Papers material was within the first amendment's protection. 403 U.S. at 726.
0466 F.2d at 1315.
"Id. at 1317.
wId.
"Id. at 1318.
"This was the Supreme Court's nain concern in Near. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
Similarly, in the licensing cases, the Court feared that a licensing official might arbitrarily deny
the license due to the content of the intended expression. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
This concern broadened in the obscenity cases, where the Court moved to prevent suppression of
protected expression. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
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cial rather than essential to the national security or the sensitive aspects
of foreign affairs may remain undisclosed. The CIA has been relieved
of any burden of proving the necessity of the classification and prior
restraint. This conflicts with Justice Brennan's view58 that the first
amendment tolerates no prior restraints predicated upon conjecture that
untoward consequences may result. Accordingly, he urged that only
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a transport at sea can support the issuance of even an interim
restraining order.
The Fourth Circuit, however, is not without support for its determi-
nation that the process of classification is an executive function beyond
the scope of judicial review.59 An effective argument can be advanced
that it would be extremely difficult to recognize the importance of a
particular secrecy classification without knowledge of many other re-
lated secrets. "What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear
of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put
the questioned item of information in its proper context."'10 Yet the term
"classified" is very broad, and the court has perhaps swung the balance
too far in the direction of the governmental interest. More appropriate
might be a requirement that the government show that disclosure of the
material will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable dam-
age to our Nation or its people.""
Judge Craven has suggested a possible compromise.12 A presump-
tion of reasonableness in favor of the government classification should
be established. The person challenging a classification would be required
to demonstrate that it is arbitrary and capricious before it could be
invalidated. This approach has the advantage of allowing inquiry into
the classification process. It has the serious disadvantage, however, of
shifting the burden of overcoming the heavy presumption to the person
desiring to exercise his first amendment freedom of speech.
In perspective the Marchetti decision is an unprecedented move-
ment toward the restriction of first amendment rights. It leaves open the
possibility that Marchetti's exercise of free speech will depend solely
"403 U.S. at 725-27.
"E.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970).
1466 F.2d at 1318.
"1403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
0466 F.2d at 1318.
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upon the discretion of an executive official. In view of this danger the
recent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court 3 is disappointing.
Hopefully, the determining factor in the denial was that no attempt to
restrain publication of specific material has yet been made. 4 If so, the
Court, upon actual submission of material and denial of authorization
to publish, could still determine that judicial review of the classification
system is necessary for the protection of our cherished freedoms of
speech and press.
KENNETH L. EAGLE
Consumer Protection-Disclosure of Cognovit Provisions as Security
Interests Under the Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act,' which became effective on July 1, 1969,
provides: "[I]t is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.' 2 Pursuant to authority granted by the Act,3
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has published
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z4 to implement the purposes of the
Act. Prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending Act, it was impossible
for most consumers to purchase credit in any rational or intelligent
manner5 The problem was not simply an inability to understand com-
plex finance charges, for consumers were (and still are) often intimi-
dated by the legalistic language that is so lavishly employed in both the
large and fine print of loan instruments.
Creditors often retain security interests' within the body of loan
-93 S. Ct. 553 (1972).
"
4McCormick, Marchetti v. United States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1972, at 21, cols. 5-6 (city
ed.).
,15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
VId. § 160 1.
d.
112 C.F.R. Part 226 (1972).
5B. CLARK & J. FONESCA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 137 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CLARK & FONESCA].
6 "Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which se-
cures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages,
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instruments. This may be unknown to the debtor, or if known, the legal
effect is generally not fully understood.7 For this reason, the Truth in
Lending Act requires that creditors disclose security interests that arise
from consumer credit sales that are not connected with an open-end
credit plan." In a recent case, Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co.,9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reached an
unsatisfying result by reversing the district court and holding that a
confession of judgment or cognovit clause 10 need not be disclosed as a
security interest by creditors in Alaska. The court arrived at this result
in a manner that seems overly technical and against the spirit and
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act."
Sandra Douglas had instituted a class action against Beneficial
Finance Company by charging that Beneficial had violated the Act by
failing to make disclosure of confession of judgment clauses contained
in promissory notes taken as evidence of debts owed by members of the
class to Beneficial. 12 The cognovit clause employed by Beneficial pro-
vided that the debtor consented to the jurisdiction of any state and that
Beneficial could have judgment by confession without notice. The clause
also provided that the debtor waived all rights of exemption and that
no lien would be created on any real property used as a principal resi-
dence during the term of the note.1
3
deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not recorded, mech-
nic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's liens in both real and
personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any
lien on property arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to
secure payment or performance of an obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1972).
7CLARK & FONESCA 110.
815 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10)(1970). Under an open-end credit plan (such as a credit card or
revolving charge account), the Act requires disclosure of "[t]he conditions under which the creditor
may retain or acquire any security interest in any property to secure the payment of any credit
extended under the plan .... " Id. § 1637(a)(7).
1469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
"
0A confession of judgment or cognovit clause, sometimes referred to as a warrant of attorney,
generally takes the form of a consent given by the debtor to the jurisdiction of any forum along
with authorization for the creditor's attorney to appear and confess judgment against him. Both
notice and opportunity to defend are waived.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
2469 F.2d at 454. The district court held that Beneficial did not have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the cognovit clause. Douglas y. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166,
1176 (D. Alas. 1971).
"The clause in question reads as follows in all of the notes:
Undersigned jointly and severally authorize and empower any attorney of law of
any court of record of the State of Alaska or elsewhere in the United States to appear
1973]
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The Act requires that creditors disclose "[a] description of any
security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in
connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the
property to which the security interest relates."" Any debtor to whom
a creditor fails to make the required disclosures may bring an action
against the creditor for damages. 5 In such an action the debtor may
recover twice the amount of finance charges with the limitation that the
total amount of recovery may not be less than one hundred dollars nor
greater than one thousand dollars." In addition, if the action is success-
ful the debtor may recover the costs of the action along with reasonable
attorney's fees.' 7 The debtor has the right to rescind any transaction in
which the creditor acquires a security interest in any real property if the
property is or is expected to be used as the principal residence of the
debtor." This right to rescind may be exercised only until midnight of
the third business day after the transaction is consummated 9 if the
creditor discloses to the debtor his rights under section 1635. The debtor
has an indefinite right to rescind, however, if the creditor fails to make
the required notice and disclosure."0 Douglas sought damages for herself
and the members of their class and sought the right to rescind for those
members of the class who owned real property used or expected to be
used as a principle residence.2'
for undersigned, or any one of undersigned, on an action on this note in any court of
the United States, State of Alaska or elsewhere in the United States at any time after
default in the payment of the amount of any installment of principal and interest
thereon, and confess judgment against any one or ll of the undersigned for the amount
due with interest and charges permitted by said Section 06.20.260, of the Alaska Stat-
utes, all without any benefit of valuation and appraisal laws. All parties hereto severally
waive demand and presentment for payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of protest
and protest of this note and agree that their liability hereunder shall not be affected by
any extension of the time of payment of all or any part of the amount owing hereon at
any time or times, and further waive all rights of exemption under the laws of this State.
It is understood and agreed that this clause shall not operate to create a lien on any real
property owned and occupied by the undersigned as a principle residence at any time
during the term of this note.
334 F. Supp. at 1170.
"15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10) (1970).
1515 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
1615 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
1715 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
115 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
'Od.
2
'Letter from Griffith L. Garwood, December 30, 1969, in 4 CCH Consumer Credit
Guide 30,245 at 66,112 (1972).
21334 F. Supp. at 1178.
COGNOVIT PRO VISIONS
Security interests are defined in Federal Reserve Board Regulation
Z to include "other consensual or confessed liens whether or not re-
corded. 12 Critical to the decisions of both the district court and the
court of appeals is the Board's Interpretation of the definition of "secu-
rity interest:"
(b) In some of the States, confession of judgment clauses or cognovit
provisions are lawful and make it possible for the holder of an obliga-
tion containing such clause or provision to record a lien on property
of the obligor simply by recordation entry of judgment; the obligor is
afforded no opportunity to enter a defense against such action prior
to entry of the judgment.
(c) Since confession of judgment clauses and cognovit provisions in
such States have the effect of depriving the obligor of the right to be
notified of a pending action and to enter a defense in a judicial proceed-
ing before judgment may be entered or recorded against him, such
clauses and provisions in those states are security interests . . .23
The district court held that the confession of judgment clause used by
Beneficial in its notes 4 was a security interest requiring disclosure under
section 1639(a)(8) of the Act. 5
Alaska has a statute which purports to make confessions of judg-
ment lawful even without notice.2 However, the district court's interpre-
tation of the requirements of rule 57(c) of the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure 7 would preclude entry of judgment without notice because
rule 93 provides for the superiority of the rules when there is a conflict
with any other statutory provision concerning procedure.2 8 Conse-
quently, the district court predicated its damage award for failure to
disclose a security interest on the impact of a confession of judgment
clause:
It is frequently stated that a forum court in a conflict of law situation
1See note 6 supra.
2Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z Interpretation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.202(b)-(c) (emphasis
added).
21See note 13 supra.
1334 F. Supp. at 1170.
2 ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1962).
2 The confession shall be made, assented to and acknowledged and judgment
given in the same manner as a confession in an action pending, but in addition, the
confession shall be verified by the oath of the person making it, and shall authorize a
judgment to be given for a particular sum.
Alaska R. Civ. P. 57(c)(2).
2334 F. Supp. at 1171.
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will apply its . . . own procedural law. [Citing Lillegraven v. Tengs,
375 P.2d 139 (Alaska 1962).] If, as defendant contends and Rule 57
implies, the entry of judgment pursuant to a confession is a procedural
matter, then the forum state need not apply Alaska Rule 57. If, on the
other hand, confession of judgment is a matter of substantive law, then
Rule 93 would be inapplicable and A.S. 09.30.050 would permit entry
of judgment without notice, not only in Alaska, but in any state look-
ing to Alaska law. In either case the confession ofjudgment clause runs
afoul of the Truth in Lending ActY.2
The Court of Appeals reversed. The notes were executed in and
subject to the laws of Alaska. The appellate court relied on the absence
of any evidence that would indicate that Beneficial had ever secured
judgments in other states as hypothesized by the lower court." Then
the court proceeded:
In such circumstances, we hold that the district court's decision disre-
gards the Board's interpretation of its regulation, which states that
confession of judgment clauses are security interests "in those States"
in which judgment may be entered without notice and hearing. The
district court's view would make this limitation meaningless.',
Confessions of judgment are not held in high regard by many com-
mentators."2 The courts have also given the practice rather close scru-
tiny in recent cases. 3 However, the practice was able to survive a
constitutional attack under the due process clause in two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co. 4
and Swarb v. Lennox, 35 that held that confessions of judgment were not
illegal per se.36 Nevertheless, the correctness of the decision in Douglas
must depend upon the Truth in Lending Act and the prescriptions of
21Id. at 1173.
3469 F.2d at 456.
3 1d.
32
"There is a nearly unanimous feeling of distaste toward the cognovit note . CLARK
& FONSECA 11l. But see Note, Consumer Protection-Truth in Lending and the Cognovlt
Judgment, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 216 (1970) in which the procedure is defended as it is applied in
Wisconsin on the grounds of economy and efficiency.
33E.g., Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrinc,
25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
34405 U.S. 174 (1972).
-405 U.S. 191 (1972).
36For a discussion of Overmyer and Swarb, see Note, Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes:
Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Civil Cases, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 554 (1973).
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System rather than upon
the esteem in which the device of confession of judgment is held.
In fact, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's interpre-
tation of the pertinent statutory and regulatory material only so far as
the meaning to be afforded the Board's Interpretation of section
226.2(z) of Regulation Z.37
It is true that the Board interprets confession of judgment clauses
to be security interests only "in those States" in which a judgment can
be awarded without notice and a hearing.35 However, it is also true that
the Board said, "In some of the States, confession of judgment clauses
or cognovit provisions are lawful and make it possible . . . to record a
lien on property. . . simply by recordation entry of judgment. .... ,,3
While the choice of law rules in this area are confused and diverse, 0 it
seems clear that many states would probably apply the Alaska law in
passing upon the validity of cognovit notes executed in Alaska." Fur-
thermore, Alaska courts would probably give full faith and credit to
judgments taken on such notes in other states.42 However, in Atlas
Credit Corp. v. Ezrine4 3 the New York Court of Appeals held that
judgments obtained in Pennsylvania under a cognovit note were not
entitled to full faith and credit as they were not true judgments and that
judgments obtained under cognovit notes violate due process of law.
Since Alaska has a specific statutory provision providing for cognovit
notes, its courts might be less likely to follow the lead of New York.
4
Therefore, it would seem that the district court's "hypothetical" is real-
istic and that Alaska law may "make it possible"4 to acquire a judg-
ment by confession.
The Board's interpretation must share the blame for the Court of
Appeals decision. The interpretation is ambiguous and clearly admits
of the meaning applied to it by the appellate court. However, the over-
31See text accompanying note 23 supra.
-12 C.F.R. § 226.202(c) (1972) (emphasis added).
3912 C.F.R. § 226.202(b) (1972) (emphasis added).
"See generally Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 111 (1961); Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina,
48 N.C.L. REv. 243 (1970).
"See 47 Am. JUR. 2d Judgments § 1120, at 166-68 (1969); Schuchman, Confession of Judg-
ment as a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 461, 464-65 (1961).
12See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1955).
4325 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
11334 F. Supp. at 1171.
4512 C.F.R. § 226.202(b) (1972).
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riding purpose of the Act is to require disclosure; it is concerned with
state law only to the extent of ensuring that consumers have the neces-
sary information so that they may make a more rational use of credit.
The Truth in Lending Act seeks to protect the consumer-debtor," and
the effect upon him is the same no matter what legal process is employed
in securing the judgment against him. Consequently, the detrimental
effects of a confession of judgment clause dictate that it be included
within the interpretation of security interest unless it is clearly excluded
by the Federal Reserve Board regulations or interpretations. Therefore
the district court's decision would seem to be more closely aligned with
the purpose and spirit of the Truth in Lending Act.
Since the court of appeals decided that the cognovit provisions
contained in Beneficial's notes were not security interests requiring dis-
closure under the Turth in Lending Act, the issue of rescission was not
reached. The district court did reach the issue and found that the right
to rescind existed.47
The Truth in Lending Act makes the following provision concern-
ing rescission:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any con-
sumer credit transaction in which a security interest is retained or
acquired in any real property which is used or is expected to be used
as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the
third business day following the consummation of the transaction or
the delivery of the disclosures required under this section . . .
The pertinent language of Regulation Z provides for recission
where "a security interest is or will be retained or acquired" 9 in the
debtor's residential real property. The Board's Interpretation of section
226.2 says that cognovit clauses are security interests "even if the judg-
ment cannot be entered until after a default by the obligor.""0 However,
when a cognovit clause expressly states that all liens upon residential
real property are excluded from its operation, then the right to rescind
does not apply.5'
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
47334 F. Supp. at 1178.
4315 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
"912 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1972) (emphasis added).
-12 C.F.R. § 226.202(c) (1972).
511d. § 226.202(d).
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Beneficial's note contained this sentence: "It is understood and
agreed that this clause shall not operate to create a lien on any real
property owned and occupied by the undersigned as a principle resi-
dence at any time during the term of this note. '5 2
The district court held that the unlimited right to rescind applied
since the note would expire upon default by the debtor and entry of
judgment and Beneficial would not be precluded by the terms of the note
from recording a lien upon the debtor's home after judgment because
the debtor waived all exemption rights.
There is no reason to believe that the language in Beneficial's notes
concerning real property was included for any reason other than to
comply with the Board's Interpretation that precludes rescission if the
cognovit clause expressly excludes liens upon real property. 3 Beneficial
has given with one hand while taking away with the other. The district
court decided correctly in holding that this is not enough.
Overmeyer and Swarb have left the constitutional status of the
cognovit note uncertain. A clear holding of unconstitutionality would
have completely eliminated the problem. Some states do not allow the
use of cognovit notes, 4 some allow it with procedural restrictions (e.g.,
Alaska),5 and some allow the use of cognovit notes at least to some
extent without notice and hearing. If a note containing a cognovit
provision is executed in a state which prohibits the use of cognovit
provisions and judgment is sought there, then no problem arises. Again,
there is no problem when a note is executed in a state where the proce-
dural laws require that notice and a hearing be given to the
debtor-there would be no security interest under the Truth and Lend-
ing Act and the consumer is protected by notice and hearing. If a
cognovit note is executed in a state permitting the use of cognovit provi-
sions and judgment is sought there, then clearly disclosure must be made
under the Act.5 The difficulty arises when a note is executed in a state
2See note 13 supra (emphasis added).
-12 C.F.R. § 226.202(d) (1972).
"Note, Due Process-Confession of Judgment Procedures Are Not Unconstitutional Per Se,
25 VAND. L. REv. 613, 613 n.3 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Confession of Judg-
ments-Pennsylvania Entry of Judgment by Confession Procedure Based Upon Waiver of Notice
Without Adequate Understanding by the Debtors Held Violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 16 VILL. L. REv. 571, 573 n.9 (1971).
OSee note 54 supra.
5id.
5712 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1972).
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where the use of cognovit provisions is limited in some way and judg-
ment is later sought in another state with unrestricted cognovit provi-
sions. The state in which the judgment is sought could grant the judg-
ment without notice and hearing either through the application of its
own nonrestrictive laws or through application of its own procedural
rules in conjunction with the substantive law regarding the use of cog-
novit provisions of the state of execution.
The district court's solution to this problem was to require disclo-
sure in any case where it is possible for a creditor to obtain a judgment
against the debtor through the use of a cognovit clause without notice
and hearing. The court of appeals, by dwelling upon the language "in
those States""8 in the Board's Interpretation has replaced a solution that
is more in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Truth in Lending
Act with one that seems technical and against the purpose of the Act.
The impact of this decision is somewhat limited. As previously indi-
cated, only a few states allow unrestrictied use of cognovit provisions."
Moreover, the Swarb and Overmeyer decisions raise grave doubts as to
the constitutionality of the cognovit provisions employed by Beneficial
in this case and in most consumer credit transactions.
D. STEVE ROBBINS
Criminal Law-Increased Sentences on an Appeal by Right from Inferior
Courts
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina
v. Pearce' that a criminal defendant who had successfully appealed his
original conviction could not receive a more severe sentence on reconvic-
tion unless the increase directly resulted from defendant's conduct sub-
sequent to his original conviction. The Court concluded that while there
was no absolute constitutional bar to an increased sentence on retrial,2
due process precluded penalizing a defendant for having successfully
11469 F.2d at 456.
59See note 54 supra.
1395 U.S. 711 (1969).
"'We hold, therefore, that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection
Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction." Id. at 723.
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attacked his original conviction. 3 Since a defendant who feared judicial
retaliation through vindictive sentencing could unconstitutionally be
deterred from exercising his right to appeal, due process required that
a defendant be freed of such an apprehension. 4 The Court therefore
imposed a rule that severely limited the imposition of increased sent-
ences on retrial.'
However, in 1972 the United States Supreme Court held in Colten
v. Kentucky' that a criminal defendant who had exercised his absolute
right to a trial de novo in a superior court following conviction in an
inferior court could receive a more severe sentence upon reconviction
in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the
danger of being penalized for seeking a new trial was not inherent in
the Colten situation, 7 nor would a defendant be deterred from exercising
his absolute right to a new trial by a fear of judicial vindictiveness.' Thus
due process did not require the application of the Pearce rule to de novo
trials?
31d. at 724; see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). See also Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
4395 U.S. at 725.
'The Court formulated the Pearce rule as follows:
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that when-
ever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the
reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occur-
ring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 726.
192 S. Ct. 1953 (1972).
71d. at 1960.
81d. For a discussion of the opposite view see Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial After North
Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 455-60 (1970). See also, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1, 187-92 (1969); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 837 (1969).
'he following cases have held that the Pearce Court's reasoning was applicable to trial de
novo: Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on ground of possible
mootness sub nom. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971); Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F.
Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972); Torrance v. Henry, 304 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Bronstein v.
Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 251, 475 P.2d 235 (1970); State v. Shak, 51 Hawaii 626, 466 P.2d 420
(1970); Eldridge v. State, - Ind. _ 267 N.E.2d 48 (1971); Cherry v. State, 9 Md. App. 416,
264 A.2d 887 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harper, 219 Pa. Super. 100, 280 A.2d 637 (1971).
Contra: Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970);
Mann v. Commonwealth, _ Mass. _., 271 N.E.2d 331 (1971); People v. Olary, 382 Mich.
559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1971); State v.
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Lewis Colten was tried and convicted of disorderly conduct in a
Kentucky inferior court." Inferior courts in Kentucky have jurisdiction
over those criminal offenses which are punishable by a maximum of one
year's imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine." Trials in the infe-
rior courts, the first tier of the Kentucky two-tier system, are generally
speedier and less costly than trials conducted in a court of general
jurisdiction, but they lack some of the constitutional safeguards avail-
able in the superior courts.'2 The defendant in the inferior court may
either enter a defense to the charge or plead guilty. In either case, a
defendant convicted in an inferior court has an absolute right to a trial
de novo in a superior court.13 In the trial de novo the case proceeds as
if brought in the superior court in the first instance." When Colten was
given an increased sentence following his conviction in the trial de novo,
he appealed his conviction on the basis that the Pearce rule was applica-
ble to the trial de novo. 5 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed his
Stanosheck, 186 Neb. 17, 180 N.W.2d 226 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d
897 (1970); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 186 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925
(1972); Evans v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d 247 (1969).
"
0The defendant was originally convicted in the Quarterly Court of Fayette County, Kentucky.
The Quarterly Court, a court of limited criminal jurisdiction, does not make a record of its
proceedings. Defendant was there fined ten dollars, and he exercised his right to appeal to a
superior court. Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1971).
"KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.010, 26.010 (1970).
"
2The extent to which inferior courts afford a defendant full protection of his constitutional
rights varies from state to state. Many inferior courts make no record of the proceedings, fail to
insure a jury trial, and generally conduct trials in a more relaxed manner than the trials conducted
in a court of general criminal jurisdiction.
"Ky. R. CRIM. P. 12.06. For an example of judicial application of a prior formulation of
this rule see Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1957).
"Ky. R. CRIM. P. 12.06 provides that: "Appeals taken to the circuit court shall be docketed
by the clerk thereof as a regular criminal prosecution and shall be tried anew, as if no judgment
had been rendered, and the judgment shall be considered as affirmed to the extent of the punish-
ment, if any, adjudged against the defendant in the circuit court ...." Many states have similar
statutory provisions: ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-371 (1956), § 22-375 (Supp. 1972-73); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 44-509 (1964); COLO R. CRIM. P. 37; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.41-.45 (Supp. 1972-
73); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-713 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3609 to -3610 (Supp. 1972); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 156 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 43 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.1226 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 488.20, 633.20-.22 (Supp. 1973); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 1201-02 (Supp. 1972); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 22; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2004,
-2009 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601, -611 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 189.010-.080 (1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 502:18,502-A:l 1-12 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-15-1 to -3 (1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-177 (1965), § 15.177.1 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CTN. CODE § 33-12-40 (1960);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 44.17 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.20.070 (1965); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 50-18-2 (1966).
"Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1956 (1972). On trial de novo defendant was again
convicted, this time in the circuit court, a court of general criminal jurisdiction. He was then fined
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conviction." Colten then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. 7
Colten argued that the rationale used by the Court in Pearce to
limit the imposition of increased sentences on appeal was equally applic-
able to the trial de novo:15
Both . . .involve reconviction and resentencing, both provide the con-
victed defendant with the right to "appeal" and in both-even though
under the Kentucky scheme the "appeal" is in reality a trial de
novo-a penalty for the same crime is fixed twice, with the same
potential for an increased penalty upon a successful "appeal."' 9
The only real distinction, according to Colten, was in the source of
authority for his new trial. In Pearce the new trial was granted after an
appellate court determination that the decision of the trial court could
not stand; in Colten the authority for the trial de novo came directly
from a statutory provision." Since no record was made of the inferior
court proceedings, appellate review in Colten was impossible. The stat-
ute, therefore, compensated for a lack of review of the inferior court
trial by assuring the defendant of a right to a new trial. Thus the distinc-
tion was in form and not substance and should not afford a basis for
withholding the Pearce limitation on increased sentences to the trial de
novo situation.2'
The Court concluded, however, that there were in fact several
meaningful distinctions between a retrial on remand and a trial de
novo.
22
fifty dollars and costs. The circuit court judge offered no explanation for the more severe sentence.
Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1971).
"The defendant appealed the decision of the circuit court to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
He challenged the constitutionality of the Kentucky Disorderly Conduct Statute as well as the
imposition of a more severe sentence in the circuit court. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the statute and the imposition of the increased sentence. Colten v. Common-
wealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 378-79 (Ky. 1971).
'"Colten argued that the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally broad and vague
both on its face and as applied, and that the increased sentence twice placed him in jeopardy and
deprived him of due process of law. Brief for Appellant at 15, 32, 38, Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S.
Ct. 1953 (1972).
"Id. at 40.
"Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1960 (1972).
2 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
21Brief for Appellant at 41.
2Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, took the view that Pearce was based upon the recognition
that "whenever a defendant is tried twice for the same offense, there is inherent in the situation
the danger of vindictive sentencing the second time around, and that this danger will deter some
defendants from seeking a second trial." 92 S. Ct. at 1965.
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We note first the obvious: that the court which conducted Colten's
trial and imposed the final sentence was not the court with whose work
Colten was sufficiently dissatisfied to seek a different result on appeal;
and it is not the court that is asked to do over what it thought it had
already done correctly. Nor is the de novo court even asked to find
error in another court's work.?3
Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reason to believe
that the superior court would deal any more strictly with a trial de novo
defendant than with a defendant initially appearing before that court. 24
The reasons offered by the Court to distinguish Pearce from the
trial de novo situation in Colten are not completely convincing. The
Supreme Court seemed to believe that the danger of vindictiveness was
greater in Pearce because he was sentenced on retrial by the same court
from which he had successfully appealed. Technically it was the same
court, the Superior Court of North Carolina sitting in Durham
County,2 but two different judges presided over the two trials.20 If the
Court meant that Pearce was sentenced twice by the same judge, the
Court was clearly wrong. If the Court meant only that Pearce was
sentenced twice in the Superior Court in Durham County, the Court was
correct but its argument was greatly weakened.
Other distinctions utilized by the Court to distinguish Pearce from
Colten are similarily questionable. The Court correctly stated that the
trial de novo court in Colten was not even "asked to find error in
another court's work."' However, this is equally true of the court that
retried Pearce. Only the appellate court that remanded Pearce had the
responsibility of finding error in another court's work. The duty im-
posed on the court that retried Pearce was identical to the duty imposed
on the trial de novo court in Colten; that duty was to afford the defen-
dant a fair trial consistent with constitutional safeguards.
The Court also declared that while judicial impatience towards a
defendant who has already had one fair trial was perhaps understanda-
23ld. at 1960.
241d.
"State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
21Pearce was originally sentenced by Judge Williams. Having successfully appealed this convi-
cion, Pearce was given an increased sentence on retrial by Judge McLaughlin. State v. Pearce, 268
N.C. 707, 709, 151 S.E.2d 571,572 (1966). The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Sparrow
noted this fact but still argued that the Pearce rule should not apply to trial de novo. 276 N.C.
499, 505, 173 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1970).
2192 S. Ct. at 1960.
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ble, the trial de novo court's attitude was "much more likely" to recog-
nize the fact that the inferior courts were not designed to offer error-
free trials. 8 The conclusion of this argument would seem to be that
therefore the trial de novo court will not become impatient with a defen-
dant who has appealed from the inferior courts since he has probably
not been afforded all of his constitutional protections.
The reason that Pearce was retried at all, however, was because the
North Carolina Supreme Court determined that he had not received a
trial that was consistent with constitutional procedures.29 It seems, then,
that the court that retried Pearce was in the same position as a trial de
novo court. Neither court should have become impatient with a defen-
dant who was before the court because he had not been affbrded all of
his constitutional rights in his first trial. Yet the Pearce Court acknowl-
edged the possibility of judicial impatience, while the Colten Court did
not.
Moreover, the Court's argument assumes that the trial de novo
court will act appropriately: that the court will recognize the deficiencies
of the inferior courts and will render a fair decision unaffected by the
knowledge of defendant's prior trial. Both Pearce and Colten, however,
asserted that their respective judges had not acted appropriately in im-
posing sentence. The Pearce Court accepted the possibility that this had
occurred, and having recognized the extreme difficulty of proving that
a judge had been motiviated by vindictiveness towards a defendant in
determining his sentence, 3 the Court acted to eliminate the danger. The
standard of proof required to formulate the Pearce rule, therefore, was
something less than actual proof of judicial vindictiveness. There should
be grave concern in light of Pearce as to whether the Colten Court was
warranted in assuming that the trial de novo court will be "much more
likely" 31 to recognize the deficiencies of the inferior courts and act
appropriately. Nevertheless, the Court's critical conclusion was based
on that assumption:
We see no reason, and none is offered, to assume that the de novo court
will deal any more strictly with those who insist on a trial in the
superior court after conviction in the Quarterly Court than it would
with those defendants whose cases are filed originally in the superior
"Id; see Aplin, supra note 8, at 458-59.
nState v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
'-395 U.S. at 725 n.20.
3192 S. Ct. at 1960.
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court and who choose to put the State to its proof in a trial subject to
constitutional guarantees. 32
At least one commentator has reached a contrary conclusion:
Procedural complication also increases the pressure on officials to
dispose of cases with the acquiescence of the accused. An ironic result
of over-reliance on discretionary disposition is that, however compas-
sionate its intent, the need to gain this acquiescence leads officials to
place a heavy price in the form of enhanced severity on those who
invoke the formal process but do not succeed in avoiding punish-
ment.33
Yet one recent study dramatically supports the Court's conclusion.34
The results of this survey show that forty-four percent of the defendants
who had appealed their convictions in the inferior courts of Boston,
Massachusetts, were given lighter sentences in the superior courts, while
only one percent of those defendants were given increased sentences. 3
These figures seem to support the conclusion that trial de novo courts
do not, as a general policy, impose more severe sentences on defendants
who appeal from the inferior courts. Yet Pearce was not based on a
finding that courts followed such a policy, but only on the finding that
increased sentences did occur with sufficient frequency to require pro-
tection of defendant's rights.3 1 Conversely, the Colten Court did not
base its decision on the infrequency of increased sentences in the supe-
rior court. Colten thus cannot be distinguished from Pearce on this
basis.
Colten also argued that Kentucky's two-tier court system placed an
unconstitutional burden on defendant's right to a fair trial .3 A defen-
dant who is charged with a misdemeanor in Kentucky is generally re-
quired to stand trial in a court which was not designed to afford the
defendant a trial consistent with constitutional requirements. When the
defendant seeks such a trial, however, he is told that he may suffer a
more severe sentence than that received in the inferior court. Colten
321d.
1Rosett, Discretion, Severeity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12, 26
(1972).
"See Note, Abolition of Trial De Novo-An Error in Judgment, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919,
923 (1972).
'Id.
1395 U.S. at 725. See also 92 S. Ct. at 1960.
'Brief for Appellant at 46-47.
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argued that this was contrary to fundamental notions of procedural
fairness. Thus defendant was unduly disadvantaged in seeking a fair
trial.
The Court concluded that Kentucky's two-tier court system did not
disadvantage defendants as long as a trial in a court of general jurisdic-
tion was available to them.38 The Court noted the advantages a defen-
dant received in the inferior court: simple and speedy proceedings, leni-
ent sentences, the opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case, the
aid of counsel if confronted with the realistic threat of a prison sentence,
and the opportunity to dispense with the inferior court trial by pleading
guilty and then promptly receiving a trial de novo in a superior court.39
The state had none of these options. The Court characterized the infe-
rior court trial as merely "an offer in settlement" of defendant's case
which the defendant was free to accept or refuse."0
It is clear that the defendant does suffer some disadvantages in
being tried in the inferior court. The defendant does not have the option
of electing whether he will receive an inferior court trial.41 Therefore
some defendants who want a trial in the inferior court do not receive
one, while other defendants are forced to go into the inferior court when
they have no intention of waiving their right to a trial fully protected
by constitutional safeguards. A defendant who is represented by a law-
yer in both the inferior and superior courts will suffer an increase in
attorney's fees. Also, defendant may suffer a greater delay in receiving
a final determination of his case than if he were permitted to go directly
to the superior court. Further, in order to bypass an inferior court trial
the defendant must plead guilty. The Court believed that these disadvan-
tages were balanced by the advantages available to the defendant in the
two-tier system. Since any burden on defendant's right to appeal was
offset by the benefits he received, there was no violation of due process.4"
The Court also concluded that if the Pearce rule were applied to
the trial de novo, inferior court judges might cease imposing lenient
"92 S. Ct. at 1961. The Court seems here to adopt implicitly the view that a burden on
defendant's right to appeal does not violate due process as long as that burden is a reasonable one.
See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 355-56 (1st Cir. 1969); Mann v. Commonwealth,
Mass. ___ 271 N.E.2d 331, 334-35 (1971).
'92 S. Ct. at 1961.
"Id; see Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1969).
"The arresting officer in the Kentucky system has the option of selecting the court in which
defendant is to stand trial. Id. at 1958.
41d. at 1960-61.
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sentences in order to allow superior court judges full discretion in sent-
encing defendants on reconviction.43 This is one possible result of
applying the Pearce rule to trial de novo. Another possibility is that
nearly all defendants might exercise their right to a trial de novo if they
were protected from the threat of increased sentences in the superior
courts. Defendants then would have nothing to lose by appealing. Either
of these possibilities would result in so many appeals to the superior
courts that the existence of the inferior courts would be threatened.
These predictions, however, conflict with actual experience. In
Minnesota application of the Pearce rule to trial de novo did not result
in an undue burden on the superior courts.44 Also, New Mexico has had
a statute since 1968 which prohibits increased sentences in the superior
court. 5 Apparently the inferior courts of New Mexico are still operating
effectively to relieve the caseload burden of the superior courts despite
the fact that defendants have nothing to lose by appealing the sentence
of the inferior courts. Perhaps the best explanation of this experience is
that the majority of criminal defendants in the inferior courts are
guilty." For many of these defendants the only question is the severity
of the sentence to be imposed.47 Since sentences in the inferior courts
are not characteristically severe,4" the defendant realizes that while he
has nothing to lose by demanding an appeal he does not really have
anything to gain.
The question still remains, however, as to why the Court in Colten
rejected the same argument that was successful in Pearce. One answer
concerns the relative increase in severity of the sentences. In Pearce the
sentence of one defendant was increased from ten to twenty-five years."
The Pearce Court felt that this great increase in punishment by itself
was sufficient to compel a recognition of possible judicial vindictiveness
absent other mitigating evidence.5" Apparently, the fatal deficiency in
Colten's case was that his original fine of ten dollars when increased to
"Id. at 1961; see State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970).
"Brief for Respondent at 20-21, North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971).
'N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-15-3(B)(2) (Supp. 1972).
"See Note, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV., supra note 34, at 930. See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
(Tent. Draft, 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA].
"ABA 1.
"Note, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV., supra note 34, at 929.
"1395 U.S. at 714.
'Id. at 725-26.
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a fine of fifty dollars by the superior court was not shocking enough by
itself to compel the conclusion that the increased sentence had been
motivated by judicial vindictiveness. The Colten Court therefore re-
quired some evidence indicating why the superior court had treated the
defendant any differently or more severely than defendants originally
before the court.5 In Pearce the increased sentence itself was sufficient.
In Colten the Court found the increased sentence insufficient without
more evidence. Whether the Court was motivated by the factual distinc-
tions between the two types of appeals or by the belief that such a
decision was required to preserve the effectiveness of the inferior court
system, the rationale for the decision is debatable.
The effects of Colten on the practical operation of the inferior court
system remain to be seen. Whether a criminal defendant convicted in
an inferior court will now more readily accept the sentence of the lower
court or whether inferior court judges will become more disposed to
offer lenient sentences as an incentive to defendants to accept their
judgment as final cannot be predicted. Yet two effects of this decision
are certain: the benefits of the inferior court system in terms of facilitat-
ing the efficient administration of criminal justice have been protected
from one possible threat of erosion, and the potential threat of isolated
instances of vindictive sentencing in less serious criminal cases has not
been eradicated.
ROBERT Louis QUICK
Criminal Procedure-Use of the Reasonable Doubt Standard in Ruling
on a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs the
trial judge to "order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction
of such offense or offenses."' For many years the various federal courts
of appeals set different standards for a trial judge in ruling on motions
for judgment of aquittal. However, the recent decision in United States
1192 S. Ct. at 1960.
'FED. R. CRII. P. 29(a).
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v. Taylor2 has brought uniformity3 among all of the circuits with regard
to the judicial standard of evidence necessary to allow jury consideration
of a criminal charge.' In that case Judge Friendly writing for the Second
Circuit overruled the so-called "Second Circuit doctrine,"5 promulgated
by Judge Learned Hand, which provided that the standard of evidence
necessary for a trial judge to deny a motion for a directed verdict in a
civil suit and to disallow a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case were identical.
A motion for judgment of acquittal can be made after the prosecu-
tion closes, after both sides rest, or after the jury returns an adverse
verdict.' The trial judge is then compelled to rule as a matter of law7 on
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.' The issue in controversy
among the various Courts of Appeals9 had been the proper standard to
apply in assessing whether the prosecution had produced a sufficient
quantum of evidence to justify presentation of the case to the jury. The
standard now uniformly adopted was announced by Judge Prettyman
in Curley v. United States:10
The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing upon a
motion for directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon
the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact,
a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a
doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; ....
By 1967, all the courts of appeals except the Second Circuit had adopted
this standard."
2464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
'See text accompanying note II infra.
4Actually, the overruling of the "Second Circuit doctrine," see text accompanying note 5 infra,
was dictum as the defendant's conviction was affirmed on the ground that the evidence against
him was sufficient to pass the newly adopted and more stringent test. 464 F.2d at 245.
'See text accompanying note 12 infra.
'FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), (c).
7See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); 5 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 2073, 2076 (1957).
'FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
'See, e.g., Hays v. United States, 231 F. 106, 108 (8th Cir. 1916), affd, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
"°160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).
"See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 378 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 842 (1967);
United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939 (1957); United States
v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 539 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); United States
v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Collon, 426 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1970);
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The "Second Circuit doctrine" was most notably expressed in
United States v. Feinberg:12
[T]he standard of evidence necessary to send a case to the jury is the
same in both civil and criminal cases; and . . . ,given evidence from
which a reasonable person might conclude that the charge in an indict-
ment was proved, the court will look no further, the jury must decide,
and the accused must be content with the instruction that before find-
ing him guilty they must exclude all reasonable doubt.
The doctrine became fixed as the only applicable standard in the
Second Circuit in United States v. Valenti 3 and United States v.
Feinberg,'4 decided in 1943 and 1944 respectively. 5 The latter opinion,
written by Judge Learned Hand, became the leading authority for the
doctrine, perhaps because of its distinguished author and its original
expression of justification for the standard.'6 Judge Hand reaffirmed
this standard in United States v. Andolschek: 7 "The accused at bar do
not argue that the evidence was not strong enough to support a verdict
in a civil case, and it certainly was; that being true, our review ends."
The tenor of this statement confirms the conclusiveness of the accept-
ance of the "Second Circuit doctrine" by its namesake court. Neverthe-
less, the issue was continually reviewed 8 and attacked. 9 Finally, in
United States v. Taylor1 the Second Circuit overruled Feinberg and
United States v. Williams, 311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 812 (1963); Conaway v.
United States, 349 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966); United States v.
Brown, 436 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Parrott, 434 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 979 (1971); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 986 (1971).
12140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"134 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943).
14140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"This doctrine had its origins in Looker v. United States, 240 F. 932 (2d Cir. 1917); Felder
v. United States, 9 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 648 (1926); and United States
v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932). However, a standard more like
the Curley rule had apparently been adopted in Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1918).
Even after the "Second Circuit doctrine" had been in effect, the Second Circuit sometimes ap-
peared to revert back to the Fraina criterion. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 109 F.2d 531 (2d
Cir. 1940); United States v. Wishnatzki, 77 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1935).
"6United States v. Masiello, 325 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
17142 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1944).
"E.g., United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1955), affd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
"
9United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
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insured uniformity 2l among the circuits by adopting the Curley test.
An examination of the rationale behind the "Second Circuit doc-
trine" clearly supports the decision of the court in Taylor to abandon
the doctrine. Judge Learned Hand had offered two reasons for refusing
to differentiate "between evidence which should satisfy reasonable men,
and the evidence which should satisfy reasonable men beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. ' 22 The first was that "courts-at least federal courts-have
generally declared that the standard of evidence necessary to send a case
to the jury is the same in both civil and criminal cases .... "23 The
"A caveat must be entered about the uniformity of standard that now prevails. Some circuits
hold that a special rule must be applied to cases involving circumstantial evidence. This standard,
enunciated most clearly in Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915), quoting Union
Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1909), is as follows: "Unless there is
substantial evidence of facts which excludes every other hypothesis but that of guilt it is the duty
of the trial judge to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the accused, and where all the substantial
evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse
a judgment against him."
There are interpretations of this statement which indicate that a more stringent standard than
the Curley rule has been established. For example, the Isbell test could mean that the trial judge
must grant a motion for acquittal unless the evidence excludes the hypothesis of innocence. The
standard could be defined as requiring a reversal of all convictions rendered in cases in which a
reasonable mind could reach either a guilty or innocent verdict. However, neither of these interpre-
tations are plausible because of their impracticality. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229,
232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). They must be dismissed on the further ground
that such interpretations would force the trial judge to preempt the functions of the jury by
becoming a trier of fact before submission of the case to the jury, which would then become merely
a device for checking the judge. The Supreme Court has held that it was "confusing and incorrect"
to use the Isbell rule in a jury instruction in a circumstantial evidence case. Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954).
In spite of the Court's adverse ruling on the use of this formula as a jury instruction, several
circuits have continued to use the Isbell test as the proper judicial standard by which to assess the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence when deciding upon a motion for judgment of acquittal. See,
e.g.. Cohen v. United States, 363 F.2d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966):
LaConte v. United States, 330 F.2d 700, 701 (10th Cir. 1964). But see Early v. United States, 394
F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1968). The explanation has two facets: first, the holding in Holland dealt
with the formula's use as a jury instruction; and secondly, the Isbell test has been interpreted to
mean not that the evidence must be inconsistent with every hypothesis of innocence, but rather
that reasonable minds must be able to decide that it is. The Fifth Circuit, the most tenacious
adherent of the Isbell rule (see Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1958)) has
interpreted the test in this manner: "[T]he test to be applied on motion for judgment of acquittal
and on review of denial of such motion is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or
of the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, but that of guilt,
but rather whether the jury might reasonably so conclude." Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228,
232 (5th Cir. 1954). So interpreted, the Isbell test becomes almost indistinguishable from that
enunciated in Curley. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 791 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
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second justification was that "[w]hile at times it may be practicable to
deal with these as separate Without unreal refinements, in the long run
the line between them is too thin for day to day use. ' 24 A later decision
opined that mandatory consideration of the reasonable doubt standard
by the judge would add nothing to the judicial process but confusion .2
This "too thin for'day to day use ' 2 argument has been attacked
as illogical and patently untrue.2 It is illogical because it implies that
judges are incapable of distinguishing between evidence which merely
preponderates and that which is capable of persuading reasonable minds
beyond a reasonable doubt, while untrained laymen who comprise the
jury are saddled with that very responsibility.28 This justification for the
"Second Circuit doctrine" is irrational because judges are required to
make this same distinction when they sit in a criminal case without a
jury.29 Judges must also make a similar distinction in civil cases in which
the clear, cogent, and convincing standard of proof is employed.30
Some proponents of the "Second Circuit doctrine" contend that
the Curley standard requires that a trial judge preempt the function of
the jury by forcing him to decide that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt before he can send the case to the jury.31 This argu-
ment not only fails to consider a basic procedural rule of law but is
based on a fundamental misconception of the Curley test. First, the trial
judge in a jury trial is not the trier-of-fact; therefore he may not properly
consider the credibility of the witnesses. 2 In applying the Curley stan-
241d.
"United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), affd per curiam, 315
F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCe §§ 2497-98
(3d ed. 1940).
"United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"See, e.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) (government's case must fail in a denaturaliza-
tion proceeding if proof is sufficient only to meet the preponderance standard); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (same); Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286,
301 (1894) (judge's decision as to prior use of a patented device must be based on proof which
leaves no reasonable doubt).
"E.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1956).
"E.g., United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969). See also United States
v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970) (noting that the same rule applies to appellate courts).
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dard, he must evaluate the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in
the light most favorable to the state,33 unless a particular piece of
testimony is manifestly incredible, 34 and must leave the establishment
of testimonial inferences to the jury.35 The trial judge is thereby prohib-
ited from preempting the fact-finding function of the jury. Secondly, the
Curley test does not require the judge to find that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt before he can submit the case to the jury;
he must only be able to conclude that reasonable minds could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming37 of the "Second Circuit
doctrine" is its emasculation of the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable doubt standard. The presumption of innocence is the corner-
stone of our accusatorial system of criminal justice,38 which requires
that the state prove the guilt of the defendant by independent evidence
obtained through police investigation rather than by compelled confes-
sion, as under an inquisitorial system.39 Although it has been generally
accepted that the presumption of innocence no longer has any direct
evidentiary significance," the presumption has spawned development of
the reasonable-doubt standard of evidence necessary to sustain a crimi-
nal conviction. 4
There are several viable reasons for requiring that guilt be proved
'3E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d
1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
31See Rodgers v. United States, 402 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1968).
"E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d
1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1956).
"There are two other possible constitutional consequences of the "Second Circuit doctrine,"
full consideration of which is prohibited by the strictures of time and space. First, the fifth amend-
ment's proscription against coerced self-incrimination could arguably be breached by the use of
this rule in conjunction with the "waiver doctrine" on appeal. See Comment, The Motion For
Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151, 1152-56 (1961). Secondly, the defendant
might be coerced into abandoning his right to a jury trial by the desire to compel the trial judge to
apply the reasonable doubt standard himself in a bench trial. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"'he accusatorial nature of our system of criminal justice is documented by various provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (privilege against self-incrimination),
amend. VI (right to confrontation and compulsory process), amend. VIII (right to bail).
39Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949).
11J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 566-76 (1898):
9 WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE § 2511(2) (3d ed. 1940).
"In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
23, § 341(c). For a definition of the reasonable doubt standard which distinguishes it from the
preponderance standard, see United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., concurring).
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beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials. The very nature of the
criminal process mandates adoption of a more stringent standard of
guilt than in a civil action. While an erroneous judgment for one party
in a civil case is no worse than an incorrect decision for his adversary,
the conviction of an innocent man is a loss for all society. Not only does
the convicted innocent defendant suffer an unjust loss of liberty, but the
state's interest in a precise judicial system is defeated,4" and the legiti-
macy and popular support of that system is undermined. 3 In addition,
the criminal sanction of imprisonment and concomitant stigmatization
is much more serious than the pecuniary consequence of a civil action.44
Finally, there is a basic imbalance in resources, prestige, and power-all
in favor of the state. 5 For these reasons, the Supreme Court explicitly
held in In re Winship4" that the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."
The "Second Circuit doctrine" did not directly remove the reasona-
ble doubt standard from the criminal trial, as the jury was always in-
structed that they must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.47 However, the rule did have the effect of preventing judicial
consideration of the reasonable doubt standard. Judge Frank charac-
terized this result as a reduction of the criminal standard "to little more
than a verbal ritual, a ceremonial set of words included in the judge's
charge."49 As a later Second Circuit opinion noted, "the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a direction to the jury" which "can-
4 Cf. Comment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 40, at 1158.
aIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
"Id. at 363. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 23, § 341(c), at 798: "The consequences
to the life, liberty and good name of the accused from an erroneous conviction of a crime are
usually more serious than the effects of an erroneous judgment in a civil case."
"See Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5
BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 40 (1955): "To prosecute is far easier than to defend. The prosecutor is
normally assumed to represent right and justice, and on top of that he almost invariably enjoys
far more investigative assistance and resources generally." For a contrary opinion by a principal
in the "Second Circuit doctrine" debate, see United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646. 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) (L. Hand, J.).
46397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
"See United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); United
States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364
(2d Cir. 1943).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
Old. at 288.
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not be accorded a quantitative value other than as a general cautionary
admonition."5 Consequently, under the "Second Circuit doctrine"
there was no viable means of judicial evaluation of the application of
the reasonable doubt standard by the jury. The judge was denied the
opportunity to prevent the jury from operating beyond its province, for
he no longer had any efficient means to prevent the jury from reaching
a verdict based on conjecture, speculation, passion, or prejudice."'
Application of the "Second Circuit doctrine" presented the trial
judge with two anomalous situations.52 First, when the prosecution's
case was sufficient to pass the civil preponderance test, he had to submit
it to the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard even though he was
thoroughly convinced that no reasonable mind could possibly determine
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Secondly,
he had to refuse to grant a judgment n.o.v. if the jury returned a guilty
verdict in spite of his conviction that the jury's verdict was unreasona-
ble. 4 These situations were forced upon the trial judge because the
"Second Circuit doctrine" effectively precluded him from using the
reasonable doubt standard as "either a pre-verdict or post-verdict check
on the jury."55 As Judge Frank said: "This means. . . that a man may
be jailed or put to death, although the trial judge and the upper court
are clearly convinced that the man's guilt has not been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt (i.e., they are sure that no reasonable men would
believe that his guilt has been thus proven)." 6
The rejection of the "Second Circuit doctrine" was not only wise,
it was inevitable in light of recent developments. As previously noted,
the Second Circuit, at the time of the Taylor decision, was the only
federal Court of Appeals not employing the Curley test." The natural
evolution toward uniformity among the circuits dictated the result in
Taylor.5s
I'United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1943).
"'See United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concur-
ring); Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Wapniek, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring):
United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"'United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
57See note I I supra.
"The injustice of having two different standards within the same judicial system is obvious.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court had indicated its disapproval of
the "Second Circuit doctrine" in a number of cases.59 In a slightly
different context"0 in In re Winship,61 the Court expressed disagreement
with the "too thin for day to day use" argument:
"[W]e reject the Court of Appeals' suggestion that there is, in any
event, only a 'tenuous difference' between the reasonable-doubt and
preponderance standards. The suggestion is singularly unpersuasive. In
this very case, the tridl judge's ability to distinguish between the two
standards enabled him to make a finding of guilt that he conceded he
might not have made under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."
In United States v. Vuitch,6" the Court had stated that "a court should
always set aside a jury verdict of guilt when there is not evidence from
which a jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
The significance of this dictum is enhanced in light of the holding in In
re Winship3 that the due process clause requires proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt for conviction in a criminal case and the Court's rejection
of the justification for the "Second Circuit doctrine" as "singularly
unpersuasive."
The next logical step for the Supreme Court would have been to
declare that the Constitution mandates the application of the reasonable
doubt standard by the trial judge in assessing the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence in a criminal case so that due process is not
denied to a criminal defendant by a jury verdict based on mere conjec-
ture, speculation, passion or prejudice. The decision in Taylor makes
Supreme Court consideration of this issue unnecessary.
JOHN MICHAEL Kops
A defendant should not be sent to prison in the Second Circuit when the identical case against
him in the Fifth Circuit would result in a directed verdict of acquittal.
"See, e.g., Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944):
But we have never hestiated to examine a record to determine whether there was
any competent and substantial evidence fairly tending to support the verdict. Cf. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619. Our examination of the record.in this case convinces
us that there was a complete lack of relevant evidence from which the jury could properly
find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioners [were guilty].
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 (1946), the Court stated: "The
verdict in a criminal case is sustained only when there is 'relevant evidence from which the jury
could properly find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt,' that the accused is guilty."
WHere, there was a bench trial in a New York State juvenile court.
61397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
62402 U.S. 62, 72 n.7 (1971).
-397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
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Evidence-How Some Courts Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Polygraph
Courts have traditionally viewed the polygraph or "lie detector"
with suspicion. Although the polygraph is widely used in non-judicial
areas and in pre-trial investigation, test results have not been admissible
as evidence in court.' However, three recent trial court deci-
sions-United States v. Ridling,2 United States v. Zeiger,3 and a pa-
ternity proceeding styled A v. B4-have reexamined the issue and have
ruled that expert testimony interpreting polygraph results is admissible.
Ridling was a prosecution for perjury.' Defendant sought to have
admitted into evidence the results of a polygraph test he had taken
voluntarily. After a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that
polygraph results were admissible on the limited issue of the defendant's
veracity.' However, the court conditioned admissibility on defendant's
subjecting himself voluntarily to a second test to be conducted by a
polygraph examiner appointed by the court. 7
Defendant in Zeiger was charged with committing an assault with
intent to kill while armed and other related offenses.' After granting a
hearing on the admissibility of the results of a polygraph test given by
the police but favorable to defendant, the court ruled in favor of its
general admission and allowed the expert to testify on the substance of
defendant's answers to factual questions about the crime as well as to
defendant's truthfulness on each answer?
In A v. B, a paternity proceeding, the court had ordered that both
parties submit to a polygraph test before trial, but the results were not
to be given to the court.'" When the mother testified that respondent was
the father, respondent sought to introduce the results of the polygraph
'See generally Bailey, Book Review, I SUFF. L. REV. 137, 138 (1967), in which the author
strongly argues that the time has come for the courts to allow admission of polygraph evidence.
2350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
3350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972).
. Misc. 2d -, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Fam. Ct., Niagara Co. 1972).
1350 F. Supp. at 92.
VId. at 98.
1Id. at 96-97.
1350 F. Supp. at 686.
I1d. at 691.
__ Misc. 2d at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 840. Since the respondent's only defense was that
the mother had had relations with other men, the trial court apparently hoped that if the polygraph
resalts showed the mother was truthful in her allegation that the respondent was the only conceiva-
ble father, the parties would settle. Id. at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
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test. After a hearing, the court allowed the polygraph examiner to testify
that the polygraph indicated that the mother was telling the truth when
she admitted during the examination to having sexual relations with
other men at the approximate time of conception."
The purpose of this note is to analyze these cases to discern the
probative value of polygraph results, the evidential standard that should
control admissibility of polygraph evidence, and the issues on which
polygraph evidence may be particularly helpful to the trier of fact.
12
The modern polygraph 3 measures various physiological respon-
ses 4 of the subject on graphs which run continually throughout the
course of the examination. 5 These responses do not automatically ap-
"Id. at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42.
"
2The issue of fifth aimendment guarantees against self-incrimination was not of immediate
concern in the context of these cases. In both Ridling and Zeiger the defendants were seeking to
introduce the evidence; A v. B was a civil action. Consequently, this note does not attempt to
discuss fifth amendment issues which would be involved in criminal actions in which the prosecu-
tion is seeking to introduce polygraph results unfavorable to a defendant. However, it should be
pointed out that Ridling stated that the prosecution could introduce unfavorable polygraph evi-
dence which was obtained under the proper conditions when the character of a defendant was in
issue. See note 60 infra.
"The development of the modern polygraph can be traced back to 1895 when Cesare Lom-
broso experimented with the correlation between lying and changes in blood pressure and pulse by
means of a "hydtosphymograph." J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU]. This is the first
recorded use of a scientific device to measure deception. However, there are existing reports that
Indians used a deception test based on the premise that lying inhibited the secretion of saliva in
the mouth-an accused was ordered to chew rice and if it stuck to his gums he was considered
guilty. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE
L.J. 694, 696 (1961).
"The present polygraph records not only blood pressure and pulse but also respiration and
galvanic skin reflex or electrodermal response. REID & INBAU 2-3. In 1945 it was discovered that
blood pressure changes sufficient to upset the accuracy of the test could be caused by unobserved
muscle activity. An instrument was then devised for recording this activity in addition to the
previously mentioned physiological responses. Id. at 3.
"
5A typical polygraph examination takes about one hour. Highleyman, The Deceptive Cer-
tainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HAST. L. J. 47, 55 (1958). This is the approximate length for the
entire examination; each separate test usually lasts only five minutes. Note, The Polygraphic
Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 330,332 (1971). Since the detection of veracity
depends on the variations in the subject's physical reactions, care must be taken to insure that
extraneous factors such as unexpected noises do not cause false readings. REID & INBAU 5-6. The
examination itself consists of a series of oral questions to which the subject must answer "yes" or
"no." Questions concerning the matter under investigation are interspersed with irrelevant ques-
tions. The examiner places the number of the question and a symbol indicating the answer given
on the recording graph as each question is asked so that later the reactions corresponding to each
type of question can be readily compared. Id. at 27. Several runs of the test are made to insure
that a responsive norm for the subject is established and to allow the examiner to adapt his
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
pear on the graph labelled as "truth" or "lie"; a determination of truth
or deception can only be made by a competent examiner's analysis of
these responses. Such determinations are based on the premise that
variations in these physiological responses as questions are answered by
the subject are an indication of his truthfulness:
[T]he act of lying leads to conscious conflict; conflict induces fear
or anxiety, which in turn results in clearly measurable physiological
change. . . . The theory contains two fundamental assumptions: first,
a regular relationship between lying and certain emotional states; sec-
ond, a regular relationship between these emotional states and changes
in the body."6
Those who oppose admission of polygraph evidence have argued that
the premise is invalid.'7 In support of their argument they state that
erroneous interpretations can be caused by such factors as mental or
physical abnormalities; subject unresponsiveness; emotional tension,
fear, or anxiety; and unqualified examiners."8 Although these conten-
tions probably explain the causes for the errors made in some tests, they
do not contradict the high degree of accuracy that the polygraph has
been shown to possess. Furthermore, although critics have generally
argued that the accuracy of the test is no better than seventy to eighty
percent," other studies have shown an accuracy rate of over ninety
percent.2 0 Witnesses testifying in favor of admission in Zeiger all
questioning to prior responses of the subject. Reruns are continued until the subject's responses
consistently indicate either truth or deception. Highleyman, supra at 55-57.
"Skolnick, supra note 13, at 699-700 (emphasis in original).
'
7Id. at 701-02.
'"See generally Highleyman, supra note 15, at 57-61. But see REID & INBAU 168-203. The
observation of the subject by the examiner and the recordings on the graph itself help to prevent
any errors due to an abnormality of the examinee. Id. at 202. However, an experiment using groups
of "normal," "neurotic," and "psychotic" subjects tended to show that polygraph examiners are
less likely to correctly interpret, much less identify, persons suffering from severe mental abnormal-
ities. Heckel, Brokaw, Salzberg, & Wiggins, Polygraphic Variations in Reactivity Between Delu-
sional, Non-Delusional, and Control Groups in a "Crime" Situation, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 380,
383 (1962). This has led some commentators to suggest that additional controls be used to guard
against error due to subject eccentricity. See note 58 infra. The repetition and length of the testing
procedure tend to reduce excess anxiety or tension. REID & INBAU 174. Since the proper function-
ing of the polygraph depends on a conscious awareness of the truth and fear of detection, any lack
of such consciousness is likely to produce only an inconclusive result. Id. at 168.
"MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 207, at 506-07 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
"For example, the authors of the leading study on polygraphic technique report that in over
35,000 actual cases the percentage of known error was less than one percent and that about five
percent of the remainder constituted inconclusive tests. REID & INBAU 234.
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claimed that their tests had produced very accurate results; one testified
that there were only six errors in the 2,400 tests he had conducted that
were subject to verificationY.2 Even the psychologist who testified for the
prosecution in Zeiger admitted that he would place the accuracy of the
polygraph at a minimum of eighty-five percent.22 Furthermore, a large
part of the ten to twenty-five percent comprising non-accurate results
represents not erroneous determinations but merely tests that produced
inconclusive results.?
Despite the concurrence of opinion that polygraph evidence is relia-
ble enough to be of some probative value, it has met almost unanimous
exclusion in court. The first attempt to introduce such evidence came
in 1923 in Frye v. United States.4 In that case defendant sought to
introduce an expert to testify to the results of a systolic blood pressure
deception test,2 5 a forerunner to the modern polygraph. The court, in
excluding the evidence, said:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.26
Since Frye, virtually all other courts across the country have
reached the same result, and most of these have relied on the poly-
graph's failure to meet the Frye standard of "general acceptance." 7
21350 F. Supp. at 689.
21d. at 689-90.
23Note 20 supra.
24293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923).
21Id. at 1013.
2 ld. at 1014 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that another person subsequently
confessed to the crime for which the defendant in Frye was convicted. See Wicker, The Polygraphic
Truth Test and the* Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, 715 (1953).
2See, e.g., United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959); People v. Becker, 300 Mich.
562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); State v. Foye,
254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); Grant v. State, 213 Tenn. 440, 374 S.W.2d 391 (1964); Davis v. State,
165 Tex. Crim. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1957); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
The only reported exception was a trial court decision, People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d
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Furthermore, courts have not allowed the use of polygraph evidence in
civil cases28 and have found reversible error when collateral references
are made to the testy.2  The only exception is that some courts have
allowed the opposing parties to stipulate before the test is administered
that the results could be admitted into evidence."
Although Zeiger reiterated the rule in Frye, its restatement of that
rule amounted to a decision not to apply it." Ridling referred to the
"general acceptance" rule explicitly but refused to apply that stan-
dard.32 A v. B did not refer to the rule at all. The refusal of all three
courts to apply the Frye standard stemmed from the interpretation that
it had received in subsequent cases. The courts have interpreted "general
acceptance" as requiring proof that the reliability of the polygraph is
so high that a court would be justified in taking judicial notice of the
validity of the polygraph test.3 3 Furthermore, the failure of the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard to enumerate any guidelines for admission
has been criticized:
The Frye standard . . . tends to obscure . . . proper considerations
by asserting an undefinable general acceptance as the principle [sic] if
not sole determinative factor. The ultimate purpose of the Frye rule,
the prevention of the introduction into evidence of specious and un-
founded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such principles,
is certainly unobjectionable. It is questionable, however, whether the
Frye rule, with its introduction of a basic inconsistency into the law
of evidence, is essential to the purpose. Most of the considerations
which have apparently moved the courts to apply the Frye doctrine to
various scientific principles may be adequately accomodated within the
usual rules . . .
348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938), but this decision was impliedly overruled by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). For a discussion of numerous unreported trial decisions that have
allowed admissibility, see Ferguson, Polygraph v. Outdated Precedent, 35 TEX. B.J. 531 (1972),
2'E.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1961); Stone v. Earp, 331
Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
"E.g., State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962) (mentioning that defendant refused
to take test); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952) (mentioning that defendant
took lie detector test).
"E.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App.
2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948). But see Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); State
v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
3'350 F. Supp. at 686-88.
32350 F. Supp. at 94-95.
"See MCCORMICK § 203, at 491; Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in
the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 385-86 (1964).
"'Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1,
14 (1970).
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Thus, critics of the Frye standard have urged that the traditional
standards of expert qualification and of balancing logical relevancy
against exclusionary policy considerations not only are sufficient safe-
guards but also enable the courts to determine under what circumstan-
ces the admissibility of polygraph evidence would be proper.35 As
Ridling pointed out, under traditional standards a proper foundation in
a particular case would require a showing that: (1) the premise on which
the evidence is based rests on a valid principle of science so that the
introduction of such evidence would be of aid to the trier of fact; (2)
the expert witness testifying is sufficiently qualified in the particular
field of concern; (3) the application of the polygraph test in the specific
case under consideration properly followed all applicable procedures to
insure that the particular test is reliable; and (4) the probative value of
the polygraph evidence in the particular case in which it is sought to be
introduced overcomes any policy reasons for exclusion. This sequen-
tial approach enables a court to consider objectively the separate factors
involved in a decision on the admissibility of polygraph evidence instead
of forcing it to consider the whole problem at one time as the "general
acceptance" standard has required.
Ridling stated that the admissibility of polygraph evidence in gen-
eral "requires that the opinion of the expert be relevant to the issue
before the Court. The acceptance of the basic theory is a part of the
process of making the evidence relevant."37 Zeiger interpreted Frye as
demanding only "general acceptance among the experts that current
polygraph technique possesses a degree of reliability which satisfies the
courts of its probative value."38 Thus, both the Ridling and Zeiger
courts required preliminary proof that the general theory of the poly-
graph be "accepted." By requiring such proof, however, neither court
was demanding that the polygraph be demonstrably infallible. The proof
required was only that necessary to show that the introduction of poly-
graph evidence makes "the desired inference more probable than it
would be without the evidence. ' 3 Since both courts found the poly-
graph to be reliable, both held it to be of probative value."
"See MCCORMICK § 203, at 491. See generally Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
Conflict ii Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 395-98 (1952).
20350 F. Supp. at 94-95.
371d.
1350 F. Supp. at 688.2 MCCORMICK § 185, at 437 (emphasis omitted).
9'350 F. Supp. at 690; 350 F. Supp. at 95.
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After determining that polygraph evidence in general can be of
probative value, Ridling, Zeiger, and A v. B then balanced the particular
relevancy of polygraph evidence in the cases before them against the
policy reasons for excluding the evidence-fear that the trier of fact will
take the evidence as conclusive," dislike for testimony that usurps the
traditional function of the jury,42 and concern that collateral material
likely to cause jury distraction and to waste time will be introduced. The
courts' fear of the effect of polygraph evidence on the minds of the triers
of fact is what originally led them to require, in effect, that the poly-
graph be infallible.4 3 But the Ridling and Zeiger courts decided that by
using limiting instructions and by permitting extensive cross-
examination pointing out to the jury the polygraph's shortcomings, the
trial judge could adequately control the jury's perception of the poly-
graph's reliability.44
As to the usurpation question, Zeiger noted that, although the
government in Frye had argued the point on appeal, the court "made
no comment in agreement with this position, but on the contrary, indi-
cated that at some point 'the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized.' "5 Furthermore, as Professor Strong pointed out:
Traditionally, even ordinary expert testimony on "ultimate issues" has
been judicially frowned upon. If incursion upon the jury function is
viewed as a serious objection, many scientific principles suffer from the
liability that they are commonly and necessarily incorporated into
devices or tests the results of which, unlike expert opinion, cannot be
broken down into less conclusory but still helpful data.
The fear of causing jury distraction to unnecessary collateral issues
does not truly arise by the mere admission of polygraph evidence; when
analyzed, the fear is that the main issue would take a back seat as the
parties attempt to prove or disprove the utility of the polygraph and that
"See, e.g., Highleyman, supra note 15, at 63: "[T]he use of 'lie detector' evidence invites
confusion between (I) the reliability of the objective physiological facts which are recorded by the
polygraph, and (2) the reliability of the subjective inferences of truth or deception which are drawn
from those facts by the examiner."
"See Strong, supra note 34, at 13.
'See, e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955) (seventy-five to ninety
percent accuracy held insufficient); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938)
("Can [the lie detector] be depended upon to operate with complete success on persons of varying
emotional stability?").
"350 F. Supp. at 691: 350 F. Supp. at 98.
s350 F. Supp. at 691-92 n.32.
"Strong, supra note 34, at 13.
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the admission of polygraph results with respect to one witness would
necessitate that all witnesses be subjected to it. The first consideration
is valid only in the sense that the introduction of any complicated and
disputed testimony will be followed by other supporting or contradicting
evidence; however, the court has the power to minimize this result by
limiting the extent of supporting or contradicting testimony.47 The sec-
ond concern-that all witnesses testifying would be required to submit
to a polygraph test-is one that has been raised by several courts.
48
Considering the waste of time and marginal usefulness of such evidence,
Ridling stated that it would not allow such a wide use of the polygraph:
It is argued that polygraph use will result in the injection of many
collateral issues in the trial. This could be the case if the Court were
to permit its use on all witnesses as has been urged by the defendant
in this case. This Court is not willing to go so far. 9
The trial court in A v. B, also, would not have allowed such a broad
application of the polygraph on the trial process; it held that polygraph
use was limited to the parties to the proceeding who testified. 0 Zeiger
did not even refer to this objection.
Since the reliability of the polygraph depends largely on the exam-
iner who gives the test and interprets the physiological responses re-
corded,5" the court in Ridling was especially concerned about the inter-
preter's qualifications.5 2 Although Zeiger3 and A v. B54 both discussed
the qualifications of the polygraph expert who had given the particular
test in each case, neither court expressed the concern that Ridling did.
This can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that, unlike Ridling
in which the defendant had personally chosen his examiner, 55 the poly-
graph experts in Zeiger and A v. B were not chosen by the defendants
and thus were not likely to be partial to them."
11350 F. Supp. at 691.
"'See, e.g., State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 627, 185 P.2d 147, 150 (1947); Henderson v. State,
94 Okla. Crim. 45, - 230 P.2d 495, 504, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
11350 F. Supp. at 96.
50 Misc. 2d at -- , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
51See, e.g., REID & INBAU 235; Skolnick, supra note 13, at 705; Comment, The Polygraph
Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SUFF. L. REv. 111, 119-20 (1969).
52350 F. Supp. at 96.
1350 F. Supp. at 690.
5. Misc. 2d at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
1350 F. Supp. at 96-97.
"In Zeiger the examiner was a member of the police force at the time the test was given. 350
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As Ridling pointed out, the problem of expert qualification was
accentuated in that case because the polygraph profession has not as yet
developed sufficient standards by which to police itself.57 Consequently,
Ridling concluded that "[b]ecause it may not be easy for the Court to
determine the quality of the polygraph experts tendered by the defen-
dant, it seems proper in such cases to cause polygraph experts of the
Court's own choosing to be appointed who should be directed to test the
defendant."" In addition, Ridling limited the admissibility of evidence
of polygraph results, whether by the testimony of the court-appointed
expert or by that of the defendant's expert, to those cases in which the
court-appointed expert can definitely conclude that the subject is or is
not telling the truth." If the court-appointed expert can make such a
conclusion, then the evidence is admissible, the trial court said, whether
his interpretation agrees with that of the defendant's expert or not."0
No judicial procedures designed to minimize the importance of the
objectionable features of polygraph evidence, short of exclusion, can
altogether eliminate the risk of admitting unreliable results. Thus the
court must ultimately balance the probative value of the polygraph
evidence in the light of the particular circumstances in which it is sought
to be introduced against the considerations that argue for exclusion. The
courts in Ridling and A v. B stated that they favored limiting the admis-
F. Supp. at 686. In A v. B the expert was the official polygraph examiner for the county.
Misc. 2d at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
17350 F. Supp. at 96. Because of the problem of a lack of standards among the polygraph
profession, REID & INBAU at 257 suggested that:
Before permitting the results [of a polygraph test] to be admitted as evidence in any
case, however, the court should require the following: (1) That the examiner possess a
college degree. (2) That he has received at least six months of internship training under
an experienced, competent examiner or examiners with a sufficient volume of case work
to afford frequent supervised testing in actual case situations. (3) That the witness have
at least five years' experience as a specialist in the field of Polygraph examinations. (4)
That the examiner's testimony must be based upon Polygraph records that he produces
in court and which are available for cross examination purposes.
1350 F. Supp. at 96-97. Because of the particular danger of polygraph error caused by the
examiner's inability in some cases to interpret the results correctly when the subject is psychologi-
cally abnormal, some commentators have suggested that obtaining a competent examiner is not
enough. Instead, they recommend using a psychologist who can more readily observe the subject's
behavior in addition to the examiner. Comment, 4 SUFF. L. REV., supra note 51, at 122 n.60.
11350 F. Supp. at 97.
"Id. Since truth was a substantive issue in the case, Ridling stated that the results of the test
could be used by either party. Id. at 98. Furthermore, because a polygraph test requires the
voluntary consent of the subject, the court felt that any privilege against self-incrimination could
be waived if adequate warnings were given. Id. at 97.
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sibility of polygraph evidence to those instances in which the question
of truthfulness is of extraordinary importance."' As Ridling pointed out:
A perjury case is based on "willfully" or "knowingly" giving false
evidence. The experts all agree that the polygraph examination is
aimed exactly at this aspect of truth. A subject . . . may be honestly
mistaken as to a fact and, if he answers according to his honest belief,
the operator will interpret the results as being a truthful answer.62
The court in A v. B allowed polygraph testimony for the purpose of
attacking the credibility of the mother who had testified.6 :' The trial
court opinion noted that on this issue the polygraph was far more relia-
ble than many kinds of evidence, such as past conviction of crime or
reputation for truthfulness, that courts have normally allowed on the
question of credibility.64 Thus, Ridling and A v. B both held that the
usefulness of polygraph evidence outweighed the exclusionary consider-
ations when a person's truthfulness is a direct issue in the case or has
been put in issue by his own testimony. But both courts were careful to
distinguish credibility issues from questions of mere accuracy in order
to prevent the introduction of polygraph evidence under circumstances
in which the jury might interpret favorable polygraph results as signify-
ing the accuracy of a witness's recollection of facts. 5
In contrast to Ridling and A v. B, Zeiger placed no limitation on
the use of the polygraph; instead, the court stated it would allow the
polygraph examiner "to assess the truthfulness of the defendant's an-
swers to factual questions concerning the crime [of assault with intent
to kill while armed] . ,,"6 If this means that the polygraph results
were admissible only to show the defendant's subjective intent, then the
scope of admissibility is probably no wider in Zeiger than in Ridling.67
6'350 F. Supp. at 98; - Misc. 2d at , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
'350 F. Supp. at 93.
8 Misc. 2d at _, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
"Id. at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843-44.
1350 F. Supp. at 98; - Misc. 2d at - , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
11350 F. Supp. at 691.
7The element of intent in the crime charged against the defendant in Zeiger is the same as
the knowledge requirement for a perjury conviction in Ridling. Both are subjective, as opposed to
objective, elements of a crime. The ability of the polygraph to accurately detect the subject's
veracity on each element is not conditioned on the subject's being able to recollect the actual facts.
See text accompanying note 62 supra. At least one court, however, has excluded polygraph evi-
dence which a defendant sought to introduce on the issue of criminal intent because the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of the crime and because the defendant could have rationalized his
intentions between the time of the crime and the time of the polygraph test five months later. State
v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (1960).
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However, the quoted language is just as capable of being interpteted to
permit the polygraph evidence to show the defendant's belief as to how
the crime occurred. Such a decision is disturbing on at least two counts.
First, the polygraph only detects deception when there is a conscious
conflict."' It is possible for the subject to be honestly mistaken in his
memory of the events that occurred 9 or for the subject to have so
rationalized the crime 0 that there is no conflict. In such a case the
polygraph is incapable of detecting the mistaken recollection. Secondly,
the polygraph examiner cannot be cross-examined as to any fine but
crucial distinctions between the way the events actually occurred and the
way the facts were posed to the subject during the polygraph examina-
tion.7' Since the examiner's opinion is limited to his interpretation of the
actual responses given to the test questions, any statement by him on
the effect that such distinctions would have on the polygraph results is
no more than an unsupportable opinion. Only the defendant can furnish
the needed answer; however, since he has a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, he can refuse to testify and leave the jury only
to guess whether or not any crucial distinctions exist.7 2
The high reliability of the polygraph cannot be denied. Neither can
it be gainsaid that the polygraph intrudes on the traditional function of
the jury and is subject to the possibility of jury misuse. For too long,
however, the courts have preempted a rational consideration of these
countervailing points by the use of the nebulous "general acceptance"
standard. Ridling, Zeiger, and A v. B have removed this obstacle to
objective analysis. By so doing, these courts were able at least to begin
to formulate guidelines under which polygraph evidence can be properly
admitted. This is a welcome approach, regardless of what one may think
of the courts' resolutions of the issues they have raised. Ridling and A
v. B were careful in limiting the issues to which they thought polygraph
testimony would be of more than marginal utility. Zeiger, on the other
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"See text accompanying note 62 supra.
"This reason led the court in State v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444
(1960), to exclude the test results of an examinatiofi given over five months after the commission
of the crime. But see REID & INBAU 179-80.
"See Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 377, 37 N.W.2d,593, 597 (1949).
"See State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 659, 246 N.W. 314, 318 (1933). However, since this issue
has not actually been presented to the courts, it is possible that the introduction by a defendant of
favorable polygraph results may be held to constitute a waiver, at least as to those matters raised
directly by the polygraph evidence, of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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hand, did not so limit the circumstances of admission. The usefulness
of polygraph evidence on the Zeiger facts is not so apparent, and the
evidence should have been excluded. However, the usefulness of the
evidence in the narrow circumstances under which Ridling and A v. B
allowed admissibility is apparent. The experience gained from such
admissions may then be used to guide the courts in determining whether
the admissions door should be opened wider.
L. JAMES BLACKWOOD
Evidence-Testimony of Government Informers in Narcotics Cases
The practice of using informers in an effort to apprehend narcotics
peddlers and as a source of information is openly admitted by prosecu-
tors and police officials.' This standard technique is considered "essen-
tial" in combating the drug traffic since there are no complaining wit-
nesses or victims-only willing sellers and willing buyers-a fact that
forces law enforcement officers to "initiate cases" to combat the drug
trade.2 It has been estimated that almost ninety-five percent of all fed-
eral narcotics convictions are obtained as the result of the work of
informers3 and that any government success in penetrating large selling
organizations has been possible only through the use of informers and
undercover agents.4
In order for the government to infiltrate the illicit drug traffic, it
must use leverage to obtain the cooperation of reluctant participants in
the traffic.' An informant usually is a person who is facing criminal
charges and who is induced into cooperating with the government in
order to receive a "break" in the criminal process.' If an informant is
'A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 36 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LINDESMITH]; U.S.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
2TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
'Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 403 (1959).
Ild.; LINDESMITH 43. The Bureau of Narcotics operates on the premise that the more "buys"
set up and the more violators enlisted as informers, the deeper the government will penetrate into
organized crime. Comment, Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, 2 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROB. 47 (1966).
5 LINDESMITH 35.
'TASK FORCE REPORT 8. The "break" given informants is usually a reduction in charges.
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not facing criminal charges, his motivation for supplying information
may arise out of revenge or monetary reward. 7
Because drug addicts are considered crime-prone' and are directly
involved in the drug trade, they make up a large percentage of the
government's informers.' Although drug addiction itself is not a crime,,"
the addict cannot maintain his habit without violating some criminal
laws against purchase and possession of narcotics. Thus the addict is in
perpetual violation of one or several criminal laws," and the government
has enormous leverage in securing his cooperation through the threat
of heavy mandatory penalties.12 Additionally, arrests of addicts, whether
based on legitimate charges or for harassment purposes, 3 provide the
government with an extremely persuasive means of "inducing" coopera-
tion by bribing the addict with drugs" or forcing the beginnings of
withdrawal symptoms.15
A danger arises, however, in the fact that the addict-turned-
informer is useless unless he provides meaningful tips or arranges sales
that lead to prosecution. Therefore, an informer whose primary interest
is in obtaining drugs to support his habit and avoiding punishment
might commit perjury, "frame" another addict, or make a false identifi-
cation to make a case. 6 Since the informer is usually motivated by his
own self-interest, the problem is further complicated when the govern-
ment prosecutor relies heavily on the testimony of'such an informer.
The credibility of the informer is questionable, and the need for protect-
ing the defendant's rights through impeachment and jury instructions as
to the informer's credibility raises several difficult questions: to what
extent should the court allow the defense to impeach the credibility of
the informer, when should cautionary instructions be given about the
informer's credibility, and what should be included in such instructions?
The answer to these questions must recognize the government's need to
use informers effectively in narcotics cases and the defendant's right to
be protected against fabricated charges and entrapment.
7Id.
'Id. at 10.
'E.g., LINDESMITH 35-36; TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
'*Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"TASK FORCE REPORT 10.
'
2LINDESMITH 35.
"Id. at 36-38.
'T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 194-95 (1970).
1"1d.; LINDESMITH 38.
"LINDESMITH 50; Comment, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB., supra note 4, at 48-49.
[Vol. 51
TESTIMONY OF INFORMERS
The Supreme Court in On Lee v. United States17 recognized that
the government's use of informers may give rise to serious questions of
credibility entitling a defendant "to broad latitude to probe credibility
by cross-examination and to have the issues submitted to the jury with
careful instructions." 8 In a recent federal decision, United States v.
Kinnard,9 the approach put forth in On Lee was further examined by
the District of Columbia Circuit as to paid addict informers.
In Kinnard two defendants, Kinnard and Payne, were convicted for
possession and sale of heroin and failure to pay tax through the efforts
of a government informer who had arranged a sale between government
agents and the defendants."0 The informer admitted that he was a nar-
cotics user and that prior to the time he-became an informer he was in
custody in the District of Columbia charged with four counts of posses-
sion of narcotics, sale of narcotics, and burglary. After he became an
informer, the charges were reduced to two misdemeanors to which the
informer pleaded guilty and received two years probation. The informer
also received at least two hundred dollars, and his family was relocated
at the government's expense.
After his release, the informer arranged a sale with the defendant
Payne for the benefit of the informer's friend, who in reality was a
narcotics agent. There was no evidence as to the nature of the negotia-
tions between the informer and Payne except the informer's account,
which indicated that Payne was a willing seller.2' The actual sale tran-
spired at a parking lot in which Payne, the informer, and his "friend"
met with Payne's source, Kinnard, who brought the heroin and consum-
mated the sale. This transaction was witnessed by the undercover agent
acting as the informer's friend and another agent who observed from a
distance and identified the two defendants. 2
Although neither defendant testified in his own behalf, they both
raised the defense of entrapment by impeachment of the government's
informer on cross-examination. 23 The trial judge precluded cross-
examination of a narcotics agent as to the general reliability of addicts
and refused to give any special instructions on the unreliability of ad-
"343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Isd. at 757 (dictum).
1"465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).201d. at 568 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
21ld. at 576.
22d. at 569.
23Id.
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dicts. Defense counsel then sought to impeach the credibility of the
informer, who denied being an addict, by examining the needle marks
on the informer's arms and by introducing extrinsic evidence to prove
the frequency of his drug use. Since the informer admitted being a user,
the trial judge denied a request for a dermatology examination as raising
collateral issues.
Although each judge wrote his own opinion, the majority of the
court agreed that the trial judge erred in denying defense counsel the
opportunity to develop extrinsic evidence as to whether the government
informer was an addict. 4 The majority reasoned that although extrinsic
evidence ordinarily may not be used to impeach a witness's general
credibility or his specific testimony on a collateral matter, when the
government relies on the testimony of a paid informer about whom
there is suspicion of narcotic addiction, the evidence is probative of a
special motive to lie or fabricate a case against the defendant" and is
therefore admissible.2 1
Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion argued that the defendants
should automatically be entitled to a special cautionary instruction as
to the unreliability of addict informers once the informer's status as an
addict is establishedY He would not require that a request for special
instruction be made by counsel but would make it mandatory for the
court to submit such instructions to counsel as a routine set of instruc-
tions once the status of the informer is established.28 Since the cross-
examination that might have established status was erroneously ex-
cluded, the majority assumed for purposes of appeal that the informer
was an addict. In Judge Bazelon's view, the trial court's failure to
provide the special instructions constituted error." Judge Leventhal on
the other hand would not find the defendants entitled to special instruc-
tions even if addict status were established unless counsel made a re-
quest for such instructions and the informer's testimony was not corro-
borated in any material aspect." Although the special cautionary in-
structions had not been requested by counsel in accordance with Rule
2 41d.
21Id. at 574 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 579-80 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
2
'Id. at 573-74 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 579-80 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
21Jd. at 569.
281d. at 573.
"Id. at 575.
'Old. at 577.
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30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31 the majority of the
court recognized that the trial judge as a practical matter had foreclosed
a request from defense counsel by announcing his intention to refuse to
give such instructions during the trial in anticipation of counsel's later
request.3 1
The court held that the trial judge's failure to give the cautionary
instruction did not constitute reversible error unless it worked a "sub-
stantial prejudice" on the defendants.3 3 Judge Bazelon applied the
following test: "Failure to give the instruction is prejudicial when the
addict-informer's testimony contributes a material aspect of the prose-
cution's case, and it is not fully corroborated by other witnesses." 4
Under this test, the majority found that there was sufficient corrobora-
tion of the informer's testimony as to Kinnard's involvement for the jury
to have found he was not induced but was predisposed to commit the
crimes.3 5 The majority also found that the only evidence that Payne was
a willing seller was the informant's account of his negotiations with
Payne to make the sale. Since it took several attempts to get Payne to
make the sale, the court concluded that Payne could have been induced
against his will and therefore failure to give the cautionary instruction
was prejudicial error calling for reversal of Payne's conviction and a new
trial.38
Judge Adams, dissenting, would have affirmed Payne's conviction
as well. Despite the limitations on cross-examination, the dissent felt
that defense counsel had developed a considerable amount of evidence
to impeach the informant's credibility and that the trial judge did not
"
1Rule 30 provides that any party may file a written request for court instructions to the jury
at the end of the evidence or as the court reasonably directs. The requests must be written and no
party may assign as error "any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
3465 F.2d at 567-69. The dissent rejected the argument that a request in accordance with
Rule 30 for a cautionary instruction would have been futile because of defense counsel's statement
that he was not requesting an instruction on addicts or their reliability. Assuming that the issue of
adequacy of instructions was properly preserved for appeal, the dissent felt the addict-informer
instruction was properly withheld because it had not been established that the informer was an
addict. Id. at 583 (Adams, J., dissenting).
1Id. at 575 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
31Id. The only difference in Judge Leventhal's test for determining reversible error appears
to be one of semantics. Judge Bazelon determines if there is error and then if it is reversible error
while Judge Leventhal just determines if there is reversible error leaving out the intermediate step.
'Md. at 577 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
"Id. at 576-77 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 580 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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abuse his discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination since it did
not harm the defendants' casesY.3 The defense counsel's inquiry regard-
ing the informant's needle marks was excludable as collateral, 3 accord-
ing to the dissent, because it tended to show only that he lied about the
frequency of his use of narcotics and did not go "directly to defendants'
commission of the prescribed acts, their willingness to commit such acts,
or to the informer's credibility . . . ."" Had the trial judge allowed
the defense to bring in an expert to interpret the needle marks on the
informer's arms, the dissent felt that the prosecutor would have brought
in an expert to give a different interpretation. Such "a trial-within-a-
trial [is] the very result the collateral impeachment rule is designed to
prevent ... "40
Both concurring opinions that made up the majority were based on
judicial opinions that supported the necessity of a cautionary instruction
when paid government informers testify in criminal cases.4" Both opin-
ions relied on an earlier District of Columbia Circuit decision, Fletcher
v. United States," in which the court recognized that paid informers
have a self-interest motive to lie that creates the need for a special
cautionary instruction on their credibility in order to protect the defen-
dant's rights. The Fletcher court reversed the defendant's conviction
that had been based on the uncorroborated testimony of a paid govern-
ment informer who was also an addict and a narcotics peddler who had
previously been convicted and sentenced for violating the narcotics laws.
The court held that the trial judge's refusal to grant defendant's request
for a special cautionary instruction as to the testimony of a paid in-
former was a prejudicial error:
[W]here the entire case depends upon [a paid informer's] testimony,
the jury should be instructed to scrutinize it closely for the purpose of
determining whether it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon
a defendant in furtherance of the witness's own interest. Here, admit-
tedly, the usefulness of the witness-and for which he received pay-
Mid. at 581-82.
l'The general rules of evidence prohibit extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness on collateral
matters. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47, at 98 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1001 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
11465 F.2d at 582.
4d.
"Id. at 570 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 577 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
4Z158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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ment from the agent-depended wholly upon his ability to make out
a case. No other motive than his own advantage impelled him in all
that he did. 3
The Fletcher court further noted the fact that the informer was an
addict and stated that it was a "well recognized fact that a drug addict
is inherently a perjurer where his own interests are concerned . . .-.
Considering that the informer was both an addict and paid by the gov-
ernment, the court held that the defendant's rights could only be pro-
tected by either corroboration of the informer's testimony or a special
cautionary instruction to the effect that the testimony should be "re-
ceived with suspicion" and "acted upon with caution."45 Although the
District of Columbia Circuit later interpreted Fletcher as applying to
paid informers generally whether or not they are addicts,46 one circuit
appears to have limited Fletcher to its facts. 7
Other federal circuits have followed the basic principles set forth
in Fletcher," which were similarly expressed by the later Supreme Court
decision, On Lee v. United States,49 and have applied them to informers
whose testimony may have been influenced by various sources of bias
such as narcotics addiction" or use, 51 being paid," subjection to pending
criminal charges, 53 and numerous combinations of these sources of
bias. 4 Although most decisions in this area have turned on whether the
411d. at 322.
41 1d.
4sId.
"
6Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
"See United States v. Green, 327 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1964).
"SSee, e.g., Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1961); Joseph v. United States,
286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960).
49343 U.S. 747 (1952). Although On Lee dealt with a "wired for sound" informer who did
not testify at the trial of defendant, the dictum noted in the text accompanying note 18 supra has
provided courts with guiding principles by which to deal with the testimony of any government
informer.
' See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971); Young v. United States,
297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962).
"
1See, e.g., Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965) (informer also had been
convicted of armed robbery, escaped from prison and associated with men of lewd character).
"See, e.g., Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962); Orebo v. United States,
293 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1961).
"See, e.g., United States v. Green, 327 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1964) (unindicted co-conspirator);
United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960) (issue raised as to informer's use of narcot-
ics). All cases in which an accomplice testifies for the government as an informer would fall within
this area.
"See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1967) (paid and addict); Hardy v.
United States, 343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965) (paid
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informer's testimony is corroborated or not,5 some decisions have div-
ided on the issue of whether or not a request for a cautionary instruction
must be properly submitted by counsel and refused by the trial judge
before there are grounds for reversal." In United States v. Griffin57 the
Sixth Circuit held that a cautionary instruction was mandatory when the
testimony of a paid government informer, who was also a narcotics
addict, was crucial and uncorroborated even though the defense failed
to make a request for the special instruction. Although the District of
Columbia Circuit has held in a case involving a paid-addict-informer
that a cautionary instruction must be given when requested unless there
is corroboration of the informant's testimony, 58 it has urged trial courts
to caution the jury about the unreliability of informant testimony even
in absence of a request.59 In Kinnard Judge Bazelon indicated that the
better rule in the case of an addict informer would be to have the court
give the cautionary instruction on its own motion." This view provided
the major difference between the concurring opinions in Kinnard, for
Judge Leventhal followed the view that only upon a proper request
should a special cautionary instruction be available." Since the United
States Supreme Court has held that the conviction of a defendant based
solely on the testimony of a government informer would be allowed to
stand even in absence of substantial corroboration," a mandatory cau-
tionary instruction would add a condition on the use of government
and addict); Joseph v. United States, 286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960) (paid and serving a prison term
for narcotics violations).
'See. e.g., Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965); Hardy v. United States, 343
F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965). The concern over
corroboration of the informer's testimony stems in many cases from the possibility of the defendant
being forced or entrapped into committing a crime. Where the government merely affords oppor-
tunities or facilities for the commission of an offense, it does not defeat the prosecution; however,
when the criminal design originates not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of govern.
ment officials and the accused is, by persuasion, deceitful representation or inducement, lured into
commission of the criminal act, the government is precluded from prosecuting. See Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Williams, supra note 3.
51See, e.g., Young v. United States, 297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962); Joseph v. United States,
286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960).
57382 F.2d 823, 829 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
984 (1965).
5
'Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
1465 F.2d at 569, 572.
6'Id. at 577.
"
2See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
[Vol. 51
TESTIMONY OF INFORMERS
informers that the Supreme Court has not required. The dictum in On
Lee acknowledges only that the defendant is "entitled" to have the issue
of the informant's credibility submitted to the jury, not that it "must"
be submitted automatically without request. 3
Although most federal cases in this area have not been faced with
the issues involving the scope of impeachment on cross-examination of
an informant that were raised in Kinnard, such problems were examined
in United States v. Masino."1 In that case the defendant's conviction was
based almost entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a paid
informer and the defendant's accomplice. The defendant contended on
appeal that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the
two witnesses, in admitting improper rebuttal testimony, and in refusing
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury."
The informer admitted that he was a former addict on cross-
examination but claimed that he was no longer a user. The defense
sought to show that the informer was still a user, that the informer was
arrested and charged with possession of a syringe and hypodermic nee-
dle, and that the charges against the informer were subsequently
dropped on request of the prosecutor. However, the trial judge excluded
both the proffered evidence of the charge and its subsequent disposition.
The appellate court held that the trial judge committed substantial error
in restricting cross-examination of the informer since the testimony
sought was highly relevant to the informer's motives for testifying as a
government witness.6 As in Kinnard, the court in Masino recognized
that cross-examination that is directed at revealing bias or interest on
the part of the witness is proper and that the widest possible latitude
should be allowed in cross-examination where a witness is being ques-
tioned as to possible motives for testifying falsely.67 The Masino court
also found substantial error in the trial judge's failure to give a requested
cautionary instruction as to the credibility of the informer and the ac-
complice since the government's case depended almost entirely upon the
testimony of the two witnesses and was uncorroborated 6
In both Masino and Kinnard the trial judges felt that cross-
examination of the informant as to his addiction and use of narcotics
"See text accompanying note 18, supra.
6275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960).
"Id. at 131.
"Id. at 132.
71d.
"Id. at 133.
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was collateral to the issues in the case. A court's fear of undue delay
and a trial-within-a-trial on collateral issues is a very legitimate concern,
as the dissent in Kinnard noted." However, by the classical approach
to determining what is collateral, the appellate court reversals in both
cases were correct. Whether the defense counsel's theory of impeach-
ment is based on impeachment by contradiction, as the dissent in
Kinnard indicated,'" or by prior inconsistent statements, the test for
collateralness provides that facts which are independently provable by
extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness are not "collateral."', One type
of facts which meet this test are those which show bias or self-interest.,
Courts have long recognized that facts introduced to impeach cred-
ibility by showing bias are admissible and provable by extrinsic evi-
dence, 3 but have divided as to the foundation required before extrinsic
evidence can be introduced to show bias. The majority approach re-
quires that before a witness can be impeached by calling other witnesses
to prove acts or declarations showing bias, the witness under attack
must first be asked about these facts on cross-examination.74 A minority
of courts does not impose this requirement. The reason for the major-
ity approach is often said to be based on fairness to the witness, for he
might be able to explain the facts without extrinsic evidence., However,
the most logical reason is the time saved by making extrinsic evidence
unnecessary if the witness adequately explains the acts or declarations.'7
It is acknowledged, however, that when the main circumstances from
which the bias proceeds have been proved, the trial judge has discretion
to determine how far the details, whether on cross-examination or by
other witnesses, may be allowed to be brought out.7"
The dissent in Kinnard recognized this discretion in the trial judge
and argued that enough evidence had been introduced on cross-
examination of the informant to have impeached the informant's credi-
bility and that any further questions into the area would have been
"1465 F.2d at 582.
70 d.
"MCCORMICK § 36, at 70-71, § 47, at 98 & n.49; WIMORE §§ 1003, 1020.
72MCCORMICK § 36, at 71, § 47, at 99; WIGMORE §§ 1005, 1022.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 78; WIGMORE § 948.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28. I
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
7MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 81; WiGMORE § 951.
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merely cumulative. However, the numerous sources of bias brought out
on cross-examination of the informant-prior drug use, being paid, and
pending criminal charges 79-would not justify limiting cross-
examination as to the informant's addiction. Each source of bias is
different, and to say that establishing the informer's addiction after his
admitting prior use of drugs would be merely cumulative completely
ignores the major difference between an addict, who must have drugs
to exist,8" and a user who may exist without them. A number of courts,
in emphasizing the need for a cautionary instruction, have noted that
an addict (not merely a user) is an inherent perjurer when it comes to
his own interest.81
Although it may be argued that court rules should not tamper
unduly with the system of using informers to combat today's drug prob-
lems for fear of sacrificing the security of society, the serious unreliabil-
ity problems which government informers create require that the bal-
ance be struck in favor of protecting the rights and liberties of the
defendant. In order to protect the rights of the defendant, the courts
should allow a wide latitude on cross-examination of the informer in the
area of impeachment by bias. The more facts brought out relating to
different sources of bias, the greater the informant's motive to fabricate
or lie and therefore the defendant should be allowed increasing flexibil-
ity to reveal these facts to the jury.
The fact that an informant is paid or is subject to pending criminal
charges provides motive to fabricate or lie, but the fact that the inform-
ant is an addict creates a far greater motive to fabricate or lie because
his habit, of necessity, requires that he remain free and out of jail.
Rarely would an addict not be subject to pending criminal charges when
he is induced into providing his services, so this double factor provides
an awesome threat to the rights of a defendant to a fair trial. The
mandatory cautionary instruction requirement advocated by Judge Ba-
zelon would provide the best means of protecting the defendant's rights.
As pointed out by Judge Bazelon,82 the cautionary instructions should
be mandatory in the sense that the trial judge would automatically
"1465 F.2d at 581-82. Informer also lied at an identification hearing, sold drugs and had a prior
conviction for robbery.
4rASK FORCE REPORT 10.
"
1E.g., United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823, 828 (6th Cir. 1967); Fletcher v. United States,
158 F.2d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
81465 F.2d at 572-73.
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submit such instructions to the defense counsel as a part of the trial
court's routine set of instructions, and at this point the defendant could
object to the instructions if they in any way prejudiced his defense. 3 A
mandatory cautionary instruction rule would be easy for the trial judge
to apply because the question of adequacy of corroboration would not
be an issue he would have to resolve in determining whether to give the
special instructions upon a request from defense counsel. In additibn,
as also pointed out by Judge Bazelon, 4 the problem of court-appointed
attorneys who may not specialize in criminal cases and are not familiar
with criminal rules of procedure would not work to the defendant's
disadvantage if there was a failure to request special instructions in
accordance with procedural rules. s5
Under Judge Bazelon's approach, special instructions would be-
come mandatory once the addiction status of a paid informer under
pending criminal charges was established. However, regardless of
whether an informer is an addict or not, the fact that the informer is
either paid or under pending criminal charges should be sufficient to
activate the mandatory cautionary instruction rule since there is suffi-
cient motive to fabricate or lie without combination of all these sources
of bias. The cautionary instructions should instruct the jury to scruti-
nize the informant's testimony closely for the purpose of determining
whether it tends to place guilt upon a defendant in furtherance of the
informer's own interest by noting the different sources of bias brought
out on cross-examination that would supply such interest.
THOMAS S. BERKAU
'3For example, where the defendant himself is an addict or all his witnesses are addicted to
drugs, a cautionary instruction as to the unreliability of addict informers may prejudice his case.
See Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"465 F.2d at 573.
mIt should be noted that the mandatory cautionary instruction approach does not provide for
the strategical move which could be used by an experienced criminal attorney, having knowledge
of his defendant's rights, of deliberately failing to request a cautionary instruction after realizing
the trial judge has forgotten to submit the cautionary instruction to him and then upon return of
the verdict arguing for a new trial based on the trial judge's oversight. However, if it could be shown
that the attorney deliberately failed to request the instruction after realizing the trial judge's
oversight, he may be estopped from claiming error on appeal. Proof of knowledge would be
difficult to show but could be inferred from the attorney's background and experience in criminal
law. In addition, the trial judge's oversight might not be reversible error on appeal due to substan-
tial corroboration of the informant's testimony.
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Income Tax-Dominant Motivation Test Adopted For Business Bad
Debts
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Generes,'
has attempted to provide a suitable test for distinguishing business bad
debts from nonbusiness bad debts sustained by the individual taxpayer.
2
The distinction is an important one for the taxpayer because of the wide
divergence in the tax treatment of the two; the business bad debt receives
by far the greater tax benefits.3 However, the Court has provided a test
that will prove to be one of great difficulty in practice for the taxpayer.
'405 U.S. 93 (1972).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(I) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allo wed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(d) NONBUSINEss DEBTS.-
(I) General rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable
year, the losses resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the
sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for
not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "non-
business debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection
with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business.
Section 166(f), which deals with the categorization of business and nonbusiness debts in connection
with the guarantor of certain noncorporate obligations, does not apply here since the obligation
was clearly corporate.
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959) provides in part:
(2) . . . . The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in
each particular case. . . .For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the
character of the debt is to be determined by the relation which the loss resulting from
the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that
relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer
is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes within the exception
provided by that subparagraph.
(Emphasis added.)
3A nonbusiness bad debt is treated as a short-term capital loss subject to restrictions
of § 166(d)(1)(B) and §§ 1211 and 1212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Nonbusiness debts
are also restricted by § 172(d)(4) of the Code for carryback purposes. Business bad debts, on the
other hand, may be deducted against ordinary income; and the taxpayer is allowed to assert net
operating loss carrybacks under section 172 of the Code for the unused portion of the claimed bad
debt deduction. 405 U.S. at 95-96.
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The test, which focuses on the "dominant motivation"' of the taxpayer,
calls for a complex and difficult assessment by the trier of fact-an
assessment that may be set aside on review only if found clearly erro-
neous.
5
The Generes case involves the gray middle ground of the business
and nonbusiness classifications under federal tax law. Generes was both
an employee and a shareholder in a family-owned and -operated con-
struction business. He thus had both a business and a nonbusiness inter-
est in the corporation. The taxpayer's status as an employee qualified
his interest as a business interest, while his role as a shareholder gave
him a nonbusiness interest.6 But the debt, for tax purposes, must be
classed as either business or nonbusiness-it may not be apportioned.,
The taxpayer, who was president of the corporation, owned forty-
four percent of its stock (on an original investment of 38,900 dollars).
His employment with the business paid him 12,000 dollars a year for a
work week of no more than six to eight hours. The taxpayer's work
included reviewing bids and jobs, seeking and obtaining bank financing,
making cost estimates, and assisting in securing bid and performance
bonds. Other members of his family, including a son and two sons-in-
law, owned the remainder of the stock in the corporation. Generes' total
income averaged about 40,000 dollars a year from 1959 to 1962; some
19,000 dollars of this was received annually from a full-time position
Generes held as president of a savings and loan association.'
In 1958 the taxpayer signed a personal agreement with a surety to
indemnify the surety for any loss suffered by it in underwriting the
corporation's contractual obligations.' The construction corporation in
1d. at 103-05.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a), provides that decisions of the Tax Court shall be
reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals "in the same manner and to the same extent as
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury ...." Thus, findings of fact
by the Tax Court will not be disturbed on review unless they are clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ.
P. 52(a).
1405 U.S. at 100-01. Since salary as an employee generates ordinary income and is taxed as
such, a loss suffered by the taxpayer in protecting his salary will be allowed to offset ordinary
income. On the other hand, an investor realizes capital gains on the appreciation of his investment.
Due to the more favorable tax treatment allowed capital gains, as compared with ordinary income,
bad debts incurred to protect an investment will correspondingly be treated as capital losses and
offsets to ordinary income will be restricted under § 1211. See note 3 supra.
1405 U.S. at 96.
VId. at 97-98.
'it is a common practice for shareholders of a close corporation, as here, to be required to
pledge their own credit in borrowing funds. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
23 (1969).
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1962 defaulted on two project contracts, and the taxpayer indemnified
the surety to the extent of 162,104.57 dollars. The corporation went into
receivership before the taxpayer was reimbursed, and the debt was not
repaid. On his 1962 tax return the taxpayer claimed the loss as a busi-
ness bad debt and deducted it from his ordinary income. Later he filed
claims for refunds for the years 1959-1961, asserting net operating loss
carrybacks under section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for
the unused portion of the claimed bad debt deduction."0 The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed the claims, and Generes brought them be-
fore a jury in a suit for refunds in federal district court. At trial the
taxpayer testified that his sole motive in making the indemnity agree-
ment was to protect his employment with the corporation. The district
court charged the jury, over the government's objection, that a "signifi-
cant motivation" satisfied the requirement of the regulations that a
business bad debt be "proximately related to" the trade or business of
the taxpayer at the time the debt becomes worthless." Judgment for
the taxpayer resulted, and the government appealed. The Fifth Circuit
approved the significant motivation standard and affirmed."2
A writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to resolve
a conflict among the circuits as to whether a significant or dominant
motivation test should be applied.1 3 The Court rejected the significant
motivation test adopted by both the Second and Fifth Circuits and ruled
with the Seventh Circuit in adopting a test of dominant motivation for
determining the proximity of the relationship between the debt and the
taxpayer's trade or business. Using this test, the Court found that the
debt sustained by the taxpayer Generes was a nonbusiness bad debt
14
and must treated as a short-term capital loss. 15 The distinction between
"1405 U.S. at 98-99.
"Id. at 99. The Regulation is reproduced in part in note 2 supra.
"United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 135
(1971); 2 TEX. TECH L. REv. 318 (1971); 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161 (1971).
1"405 U.S. at 96.
"The Court ordered a judgment n.o.v. to be entered, stating:
The conclusion we have reached means that the District Court's instructions, based
on a standard of significant rather than dominant motivation, are erroneous and that,
at least, a new trial is required. We have examined the record, however, and find nothing
that would support a jury verdict in this taxpayer's favor had the dominant motivation
standard been embodied in the instructions. Judgment n.o.v. for the United States,
therefore, must be ordered.
The Court dismissed the taxpayer's own testimony as self-serving. Id. at 106.
1Id. at 96.
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business and nonbusiness bad debts meant a difference of over 40,000
dollars in taxes for Generes.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun noted the difference
between the business and nonbusiness interests of the taxpayer. As a
shareholder Generes had a nonbusiness interest. "It was capital in na-
ture and it was comprised initially of tax-paid dollars. Its rewards were
expectative and would flow not from personal effort, but from invest-
ment earnings and appreciation."' 6 Generes' status as an employee was
a business interest: "Its nature centered in personal effort and labor, and
salary for that endeavor would be received. The salary would consist of
pre-tax dollars.' ' 7
The Court cited the factors that led it to approve the dominant
motive test: consistency with other sections of the Internal Revenue
Code that deal with a business-nonbusiness distinction," consistency
with the Code's objectives and with an earlier decision of the Court,"
and the superior workability of the dominant motivation standard. In
attributing workability to the test, the Court noted that "[t]he trier...
may compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper
emphasis to the objective rather that to the subjective."2 The Court
added:
By making the dominant motivation the measure, the logical tax con-
sequence ensues and prevents the mere presence of a business motive,
however small and however insignificant, from controlling the tax re-
sult at the taxpayer's convenience. This is of particular importance in
a tax system which is so largely dependent on voluntary compliance.,
"Id. at 100-01.
'Id. at 101.
"'The Code, Justice Blackmun said, carefully distinguishes between business and nonbusiness
items. In § 165, 162, and 166, the Code allows particular benefits for business losses, business
expenses, and business bad debts, respectively. Many of these benefits are not available for nonbusi-
ness losses, expenses, and bad debts. Justice Blackmun concluded that application of the significant
motivation test to bad debts would have the effect of obliterating or blunting the meaningful
distinction Congress intended between business and nonbusiness bad debts. Id. at 103-04. The
Court also contended that the dominant motivation test strengthens and is consistent with the
mandate of § 262 that "'no deduction be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses' except
as otherwise provided." The dominant motivation test, the Court added, "prevents personal consid-
erations from circumventing this provision." Id. at 104-05.
"The Court asserted that the significant motivation test would "undermine and circumscribe"
an earlier decision by the Court in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). The Court noted
that Whipple emphasized that a "shareholder's mere activity in a corporation's affairs is not a trade
or business." 405 U.S. at 104.
2'405 U.S. at 104.2Id.
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The Court summarily rejected arguments that this decision is in-
consistent with the Court's approval of a significant motivation stan-
dard for liability for the accumulated earnings tax under section 531 and
for inclusion in the gross estate of a transfer made in contemplation of
death under section 2035.22 The Court also rejected definition of the
term "proximate" in the tort sense.23
In applying the test of dominant motivation to the Generes situa-
tion, the majority evaluated the taxpayer's salary and his investment in
light of the surety obligation he assumed. The Court concluded that
"reasonable minds could not ascribe . . . a dominant motivation...
to the preservation of the taxpayer's salary .... ,21
Justice Douglas, in dissent, contended that the adoption of the
dominant motivation test was an improper use of the Court to iron out
ambiguity in the regulations. Repeating an argument he had made sev-
eral times before,21 Justice Douglas urged that the responsible remedy
for ambiguity in the regulations or the Act was not judicial.26
No test or guide is offered in section 166 of the Code for determin-
2Jd. at 105. The Court cited in substantiation United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297,
303 (1969), and Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 648 (1939). The application of a significant motivation standard in both § 531
and § 2035 favors the Government. Under Donruss, if tax avoidance is a significant purpose of
an unreasonable accumulation of corporate earnings, then there will be a § 531 inclusion. Bowers
provides that if a motive to avoid estate taxes played a "substantial" part in motivating pre-death
transfers, then there will be inclusion in the gross estate under the "in contemplation of death"
criterion of § 2035. The Court stated in Generes that: "Sections 531 and 2035 are Congress'
answer to tax avoidance activity." 405 U.S. at 105.
n405 U.S. at 105.
11d. at 107. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall added emphasis in the area of legislative
history, concluding that the significant motivation test is wholly at odds with the goals of Congress.
Id. at 107-12.
"Justice Douglas cited as indicative his dissent in United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.
678, 690-91 (1969).
21Justice Douglas explained that the ironing out of ambiguity in the Regulations or the Act
requires "either a recasting of the Regulations by Treasury or presentation of the problem to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which is a standing committee of the Congress
that regularly rewrites the Act and is much abler than are we in forecasting revenue needs and
spotting loopholes where abuses thrive." 405 U.S. at 114-15. Justice Douglas added that "[r]esort
to litigation, rather than to Congress, for a change in the law is too often the temptation of
government which has a larger purse and more endurance than any taxpayer." 405 U.S. at 115.
Justice Douglas also noted that Generes' assumption of the obligation was "proximately"
related to his trade or business as the Regulations require. The bond was essential for the continued
operation of the enterprise, and therefore the bond's assumption was required for Generes to
maintain his job. "Whether it was a prudent act is not our concern. Nor is it our concern whether
with the benefit of hindsight we can now say that signing the bond entailed risks wholly dispropor-
tionate to the stake Generes had in maintaining a job with a $12,000 a year salary." Id. at 114.
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ing when a bad debt is a business bad debt. However, the regulations,
as previously noted, do provide that the debt must be "a proximate one
in the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the
debt becomes worthless"' 7 in order to qualify as a business bad debt. In
1963 the Supreme Court, in Whipple v. Commissioner,21 indicated its
approval of the proximate-relation test of the regulations by refusing to
recognize a debt as a business bad debt where there was "no proof
(which might be difficult to furnish where a taxpayer is the sole or
dominant stockholder) that the loan was necessary to keep his job or
was otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or business
as an employee." 2 The Court in Whipple, as the Court's opinion in
Generes points out,3 also noted the special difficulty of distinguishing
between business and nonbusiness bad debts where the taxpayer is both
an employee and a shareholder:
Even if the taxpayer demonstrates an independent trade or business of
his own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt losses arising from
his own business and those actually arising from activities peculiar to
an investor concerned with, and participating in, the conduct of the
corporate business. 31
Whipple has been interpreted in various ways: lower courts by turns
have used it to justify the application of both the dominant and the
significant motivation standards. The Second Circuit in late 1963 en-
dorsed the test of significant motivation in Weddle v. Commissioner,2
in which the majority pointed out that a requirement that the business
motivation be primary was simply not present in either the statute or
the regulations. Looking to the law of torts, which often uses the term
"proximate," the majority determined that a cause may be proximate
even though it is "secondary. ' 33 In a concurring opinion,34 Chief
Judge Lumbard endorsed the primary motivation standard. He con-
tended that the test of significant motivation would always yield a judg-
ment for the taxpayer, and he rejected the analogy to tort law.
2Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5 (1959), quoted note 2 supra.
-373 U.S. 193 (1963); see note 19 supra.
21373 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added).
10405 U.S. at 102.
31373 U.S. at 202.
22325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
"Id. at 851.
1Id. at 852.
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Despite this attempt in Weddle to determine the proper test for
gauging the proximity of the relationship between the debt and the
taxpayer's trade or business, many of the cases decided after Weddle
did not invoke any particular test to analyze proximity.35 But in 1969,
in Niblock v. Commissioner,36 the Seventh Circuit adopted the domi-
nant motivation standard, stating that it was the only test capable of
injecting sufficient certainty into the interpretation of section 166. The
Niblock court cited Whipple to substantiate its adoption of the domi-
nant motivation standard.
3 1
The Supreme Court's endorsement in Generes of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's dominant motivation standard involves the federal judiciary in the
complex inquiry into taxpayer motivation. The newly adopted standard,
despite the statement of Justice Blackmun attributing "workability"
38
to it, may well prove to be more difficult to apply and may result in
many inconsistent judgments. Motivation is highly elusive of effective
evaluation. Men act and react for a multitude of reasons on the basis
of stimuli that even they themselves often fail to recognize or appreciate
fully. The more the courts are required to rely on the fact finder's
assessment of the effect of these stimuli on taxpayer behavior, the more
unsatisfactory become the dispositions that necessarily rely on that as-
sessment. It is much easier to discover the presence or absence of a
substantial business motivation than to determine whether a motivation
is sufficiently substantial to be "dominant."
A further complication in the balancing of the motives is the defini-
tion of the key word "dominant." The Court does not define the term,
and the trier of fact is left with a term that is just as ambiguous as the
term "proximate" used in the regulations.39 Does "dominant" mean
the largest motive,4" as for example a thirty percent motive with three
"1See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970); Lundgren v. Commis-
sioner, 376 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1966); Kelly
v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
-417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
11Id. at 1187.
11405 U.S. at 104.
"'See note 2 supra.
"
0While there are only two categories of interest, business and nonbusiness, there are a multi-
tude of motives that may be classified under each. It is not just the weighing of the two categories
which is necessary. Were this the case the term dominant could only mean fifty-plus percent.
Rather, the trier of fact is confronted in actuality with the various motives themselves, unclassified,
and must proceed from there to find the dominant motivation. Generes leaves unanswered the
question of whether the trier of fact is obligated to classify motivational forces into the two
19731
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other lesser ones of twenty-five, twenty-five, and twenty percent magni-
tude? Or must a motive be fifty-plus percent, dwarfing all other motives
regardless of number? What if two motives-one business and one non-
business'-are so closely related in size as to be indistinguishable, with
neither one "dominant"? The difficulty inherent in such an undertaking
is obvious.
The most credible reason the Court gives for the stricter test is its
fear of loopholes. But the Court's remedy for potential abuse may deny
some taxpayers deductions to which they should be entitled.', The tax-
payer, as noted in Whipple,4 2 has the burden of establishing that the
relationship to his trade or business is proximate. The dominant motiva-
tion standard as a practical matter requires him to explain away any
motive that is not strictly business. As in Generes, the taxpayer's testi-
mony that a nonbusiness interest did not figure in his decision will often
be deemed self-serving, so the taxpayer must be able to adduce other
evidence to explain his motives. In such a situation, the taxpayer's
dominant motivation might in fact be a business one-to protect his
job-while a jury might find his primary motivation to be the protection
of his investment in the business. Numerous inconsistent judgments may
result. Two separate triers of fact faced with two identical fact situations
may reach opposing results because of the ambiguity of the test. A
taxpayer attempting to determine in advance if his loan or assumption
of debt for his corporation will later be classified as business-motivated
for tax purposes will find little guidance in previous cases in which the
standard has been applied. 3 Since a finding of dominant motivation is
categories and then reach a decision, or whether the decision may be based on the raw factors
themselves unclassified. In the latter situation, with three factors or more, the trier might look to
the largest of the factors rather than the larger of the two categories.
"In essence, the Court has simply made a judicial determination that in cases involving
employee-shareholder bad debts, as here, the taxpayer is going to lose in the majority of the cases.
This'result, which is achieved by the application of the harsher dominant motivation standard,
makes it easier for the Commissioner to achieve a favorable ruling in cases of this nature due to
the heavier burden placed on the taxpayer. However, it is doubtful that such an approach may be
justified in regard to any concept of fair and equitable taxation. Without apportionment and with
the burden weighing so heavily on the taxpayer, the probable result is that taxpayers will often be
denied in fact those tax benefits which are due them in theory.
12373 U.S. at 202.
13Advance rulings or determination letters would probably not be available due to the inher-
ently factual nature of any determination of dominant motivation. Rev. Proc. 72-9(2), 1972-I Cu,.
BULL. 28 provides in part:
It is the policy of the Service to answer inquiries of individuals and organizations,
whenever appropriate in the interest of sound tax administration, as to their status for
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factual, the taxpayer's opportunity to obtain reversal on appeal will be
greatly diminished.
The Court's justification for adopting the dominant motivation
standard pales considerably in light of the difficulty and uncertainty
inherent in its application. The "workability" attributed to the new
standard by the Court is not likely to materialize. The idea that the
"trier . . may compare the risk against the potential reward and give
proper emphasis to the objective rather than the subjective"" may have
merit in clear-cut situations, but it is an oversimplification in the major-
ity of cases, which will involve closer questions.
The Court's view that the dominant motivation test makes section
166 consistent with other sections of the Tax Code is of mitiimal signifi-
cance in view of the prospect of mass inconsistency among section 166
decisions themselves. But the significance of the Generes decision is
much broader than its section 166 application. In Leonard F.
Cremona," a tax court case decided in the wake of Generes, two concur-
ring judges suggested that the Generes dominant motivation test be
applied to differentiate between business and nonbusiness expenses
under section 162. Perhaps most important of all are the implications
of Generes for the "business purpose" requirement of tax-free corporate
reorganizations and divisions. To qualify as tax-free, these corporate
realignments in addition to satisfying statutory mechnical requirements
must meet judicially imposed conditions that include a requirement that
there be a "business purpose" motivating the transaction.46 A change
in the character of this requirement from some business purpose to a
dominant business purpose would place both the corporate taxpayer and
its shareholders in a quandary similar to that of the shareholder-
employee in Generes. The problem is intensified by the much larger
tax purposes and as to the tax effects of their acts or transactions, prior to their filing
of returns or reports as required by the revenue laws.
There are, however, certain areas where, because of the inherently factual nature
of the problems involved, or for other reasons, the Service will not issue advance rulings
or determination letters.
The areas in which no advance rulings will be issued are enumerated in Rev. Proc. 72-9. Expansion
of this list to include the determination of the dominant motivation of a shareholder-employee bad
debt seems an inevitable occurrence.
11405 U.S. at 104.
4558 T.C. 219 (1972).
6The "business purpose" requirement was first articulated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935). For a discussion of the "business purpose" requirement see J. SCOTT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND DIvisIONS 97-101 (1972).
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sums involved in these corporate transactions. The injection of this
element of uncertainty'into corporate planning would result in a severe
impediment to the effective use of these tax-free corporate reorganiza-
tions and divisions.
EDGAR M. ROACH JR.
Labor Law-Union Discipline of Supervisor Members
Section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,'
(hereinafter called the Act) provides the statutory framework within
which labor unions exercise disciplinary control over their members.'
The general rule, based upon NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co., 3 is that such discipline is a legitimate, internal union matter rarely
subject to interference from the courts.' A trend' in the courts of appeals
indicates, however, that the Allis-Chalmers doctrine does not apply
where the disciplined member happens to be a supervisor.' In two recent
'National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
2NLRA § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agencies-
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
3388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4In Allis-Chalmers the union had imposed fines upon employee members who had crossed
picket lines and continued to work during a strike in support of new contract demands. In finding
that the fines did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that "Congress did not propose
any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a
union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status." 388 U.S. at 195.
The Allis-Chalmers doctrine had a slight gloss put on it in 1969. In Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969), the Supreme Court added that union fines of members would not viola.
te § 8(b)(l)(A) "unless some impairment of a statutory labor policy [could] be shown." Id. at 432,
5See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
'See note 18 and accompanying text infra, regarding supervisors as union members.
UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISORS
decisions the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
interpreted section 8(b)(1)(B) 7 of the Act as severely limiting-if not
completely proscribing-union discipline of supervisor members.
In Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB,8 Safeway Stores, Inc., the
intervenor, operated several retail stores in the Seattle, Washington,
area. These stores contained meat markets at which meat products were
cut, packaged, and sold. The meat market employees, including supervi-
sors, were covered by contracts between the petitioner union and a
multi-employer bargaining association to which Safeway-belonged. In
July of 1968 Safeway instituted a policy directing its managers, includ-
ing a supervisor, Hall, to obtain certain meats pre-processed from a
central warehouse. The result of this procedure was to eliminate some
union work, for these meats previously had been processed by employee
union members on the premises of the retail outlets.
The union objected to the new policy and ordered its supervisor
members not to follow the directive. Hall disregarded the union's in-
structions and implemented Safeway's policy. For this conduct the
union fined him fifty dollars Safeway promptly filed a section
8(b)(1)(B) charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The Board issued a cease-and-desist order, thus holding that the union's
disciplinary action against Hall restrained and coerced Safeway in the
selection of its representative for the adjustment of grievances. The
Board further ordered rescission of the disciplinary action, reinstate-
ment to membership, and retroactive effect to any lost benefits. ° The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
Board's findings and enforced the order."
A few months later the same court again considered a possible
violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) in International Brotherhood of Electrical
7NLRA § 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(l) to restrain or coerce. . . (B) an employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment
of grievances . .. ."
8458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
'The union also imposed an additional $I0 fine for failure to appear, as requested, before the
Union Executive Board and ultimately expelled Hall for refusal to pay the fine. This resulted in a
loss of his rights to sickness and death benefits provided through his membership. Although the
bargaining agreement contained a union-shop clause under which the supervisors were required to
become and remain union members, there was no contention that this clause had been breached
by Hall's expulsion. 458 F.2d at 796 n.3.
"
0Meat Cutters Local 81, 185 N.L.R.B. 130 (1968).
"458 F.2d at 802.
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Workers v. NLRB.'2 In 1968 Illinois Bell Telephone Company had a
collective bargaining agreement with Local 134, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), AFL-CIO, similar to that in Meat
Cutters, under which all employees and certain foremen were required
to become union members. During an economic strike IllinoisBell ad-
vised the foremen members that it would like them to cross the picket
line and perform non-supervisory work during the strike. The company
left the decision as to whether to honor the work stoppage to the discre-
tion of each individual foreman. Illinois Bell made it clear that those
who chose to honor the strike would not be penalized. Conversely, the
union advised its membership that any member who chose to work
would be subject to union discipline.
Because of the union threat several of the foremen formed the Bell
Supervisor's Protective Association for the dual purpose of encouraging
other foremen to work and protecting the rights of those who did so.
After the strike the union fined each foreman who worked five hundred
dollars and imposed an additional fine of one thousand dollars on each
of the five foremen who were instrumental in the formation of the
Association. The disciplined members filed a charge with the NLRB
and, as in Meat Cutters, the Board found the fines to be a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(B).13 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
followed its prior decision in Meat Cutters and affirmed. 4
To appreciate fully the reasoning of the NLRB and the court of
appeals in both these cases, it is necessary first to examine briefly the
historical status of supervisors under the law and the development of
section 8(b)(1)(B). The original National Labor Relations Act (the
Wagner Act)15 did not except supervisors from the definition of em-
ployee. They enjoyed all the rights and protection of other employees
under the Act. Unions of supervisory employees such as the Foremen's
Association of America and the United Technical and Supervisory
Employees began to use the new protection to expand membership
greatly. 6 Following passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendment to the Act
in 1947,17 which specifically exempted supervisors, 8 the supervisor un-
"No. 71-1559 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 22, 1972).
"International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (July 14, 1971).
"No. 71-1559, at 35.
"NLRA (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935).
"See Moore, The National Labor Relations Board and Supervisors, 21 LAn. L.J. 195, 205
(1970).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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ions began to wither. Supervisory employees began to view themselves
as a part of management. 9 Nevertheless, some employees, particularly
those who had been promoted from the rank and file, took advantage
of section 14(a) of the Act, which permitted them to become or remain
union members, albeit without statutory protection.20
While an estimate of the current number of supervisors who are
union members is unavailable, one may presume that it is sufficiently
large to warrant substantial union interest in maintaining and control-
ling such members. It is also safe to say that the Meat Cutters and
IBEW interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) will seriously undermine this
interest.
The District of Columbia Circuit, interpreting legislative history,
stated in both decisions that Congress enacted section 8(b)(1)(B) in
recognition of the fact that unions had begun to pressure management
not to appoint representatives who would be too strict in dealing with
union members.2' While section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribes direct restraint or
coercion against employers in the selection of bargaining representa-
tives, the court felt it was Congress' intent that indirect interference
accomplished through union discipline of an employer's representative
also would be prohibited. 22 This shift of attention to indirect restraint
or coercion is a departure from earlier cases that proscribed direct
interference with the employer's ability to choose his representatives in
actual bargaining situations.
The first reported decision in which a union was found to have
violated section 8(b)(1)(B) was American Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation v. NLRB. 23 The union had threatened to strike for a contract
18NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) provides in part: "The term 'employee'. . . shall
not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor. ... This exempts supervisors from
the protections afforded employees by the Act. However, NLRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970) states: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becom-
ing or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter
shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose
of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining."
"See Moore, supra note 16, at 203-04.
See note 18 supra. The reasons for retention of union membership by a supervisor are several,
including obtaining additional benefits, maintaining active status in the event of a demotion or
change of jobs requiring union membership, or simply a sense of closeness to members associated
with in the past. See Gould, Some Limitations upon Union Discipline under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1129 (1970).
2 No. 71-1559, at 13; 458 F.2d at 798 n. 11.
2No. 71-1559, at 9; 458 F.2d at 798.
-193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951).
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clause that would compel the employer to hire only foremen who were
union members. The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Board's finding
of a violation, was primarily concerned that the union's objective was
to further an illegal closed-shop scheme.24 However, in 1958 in
Typographers Local 38, 2 the NLRB found a strike to obtain a similar
clause to be a violation in itself, absent any other illegal objective. The
decision was subsequently affirmed on this point by an equally divided
Supreme Court.
The few NLRB and courts of appeals decisions handed down dur-
ing the next decade found that the following conduct violated section
8(b)(1)(B): striking to procure the discharge of a labor relations consul-
tant hired by the company to prepare for negotiations; 27 threatening a
work stoppage to force the employer to accept a multi-employer asso-
ciation as his bargaining representative; 8 threatening to strike to force
the employer to abandon such an association;2 and bypassing the repre-
sentative selected by the employer and requiring him to select an-
other."0 In every case the violation involved direct action by the union
against the employer and the actual selection of a bargaining representa-
tive. Not until 1968 did the NLRB turn its attention to a union's use of
its disciplinary machinery over supervisor members.
In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers No. 1831 the Board found a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) where the union had called two supervi-
sors to appear before a union investigative committee on charges that
the supervisors had violated the labor agreement by using supervisory
and non-union personnel to do work covered by the agreement. On the
employer's instructions the supervisors refused to appear and were
fined. The Board rejected the union's argument that Allis-Chalmers was
controlling, distinguishing that case as protecting only legitimate inter-
nal union affairs. Here, though, "the relationship primarily affected
[was] one between the union and the employers. '3 The Board also held
that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) was limited to that section and not
applicable to section 8(b)(1)(B).
211d. at 805.
-123 N.L.R.B. 806 (1959).
2Typographers Local 38 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961).
"ILGWU, Los Angeles Cloak Joint Bd., 127 N.L.R.B. 1543 (1960).
2'Painters Dist. Council No. 36, 155 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1965).
"Painters Local 823, 161 N.L.R.B. 620 (1966).
"Plasterers Local 739, 157 N.L.R.B. 823 (1966).
3172 N.L.R.B. 252 (1968).
31d. at -.
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San Francisco-Oakland Mailers was not appealed, and the first
similar decision by the NLRB to be considered by a court of appeals
was NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 49.33 Citing San Francisco-
Oakland Mailers,34 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Board decision that
fining a supervisor for working before the regular work day began was
a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B). Several similar holdings have been
issued by the NLRB, and each has been affirmed by various circuits.15
Meat Cutters and IBEW, however, go further than any of the previous
cases in analyzing the intent of Congress in prohibiting indirect as well
as direct interference and distinguishing the application of Allis-
Chalmers.
The majority in IBEW reiterated the earlier proposition in Meat
Cutters that section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribes "indirect union restraint or
coercion of an employer, accomplished through the imposition of disci-
pline upon the employer's representatives for actions performed by them
within the general scope of their supervisory or managerial responsibili-
ties."36 The court did not believe this to be too broad a view of the
meaning Congress intended for the statutory language. 7 The majority
perceived this Congressional intent by examining legislative history sur-
rounding not only the enactment of section 8(b)(l)(B) but the other 1947
amendments to the Act as well, particularly section 2(3) .s
The court reasoned that "'Congress was aware of the potential
conflict between the obligations of foremen as representatives of their
employers, on the one hand, and as union members, on the other. Sec-
tion 2(3) evidences its intent to make the obligations to the employer
paramount.' "I' The court thus rejected a union contention that section
14(a) of the Act evidenced Congressional intent that supervisors be
controlled by the union that they join. The court felt that section 14(a)
"does not detract from the undivided loyalty [supervisors] owe to their
3430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1970).341d. at 1350 n.2.
-"See, e.g., Mailers Local 143, 181 N.L.R.B. 286 (1970), enforced Mailers Local 143 v.
NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carpenters Dist. Council, 177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1970), and
Carpenters Dist. Council, 176 N.L.R.B. 797 (1969), both enforced NLRB v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972); Lithographers Local 15-P, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969),
enforced NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
3'No. 71-1559, at 9 (emphasis by the court).
"Id. at 9-10.
'-See note 18 supra.
"No. 71-1559, at 13, quoting Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564, 566 (1959).
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employer under section 8(b)(1)(B) .... Similarly the fact that an
employer may have consented to the compulsory union membership of
his supervisors .. .does not negate his right to the full protection of
section 8(b)(1)(B)."40
As to the effect of Allis-Chalmers, the union urged (and the dissent
agreed) that, inasmuch as the conduct for which the discipline was
imposed, i.e., working during a strike, was the same in both Allis-
Chalmers and IBEW, the former decision should control. The majority
distinguished the two cases by stating that the Supreme Court in Allis-
Chalmers drew "'cogent support' for its decision"4 from the proviso
to section 8(b)(1)(A), which applies only to internal, union-employee
relationships. The court noted that the proviso does not apply to section
8(b)(1)(B), the disputed section in IBEW, which regulates the external,
union-employer relationship. 2
Both the majority and the dissent viewed Scofield v. NLRB43 as
standing for the principle that unions may discipline members only when
such discipline impairs no national labor policy.44 The majority, how-
ever, found that Congress had expressed a policy in section 8(b)(1)(B)
of protecting employers against union interference with their supervi-
sors.45 The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the policy was not
violated when a union merely insured "strike solidarity among its mem-
bers."4"
The majority's interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) and the intent of
Congress undoubtedly reaches the correct result. It seems unlikely that
Congress would, on the one hand, legislatively recognize that supervi-
sors are different from employees and, at the same time, intend that
unions might treat them the same as employees, when such treatment
would interfere with their status as supervisors. Indeed, the limited
language of section 14(a) itself demonstrates Congress intended that
"Id. at 15-16. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that §§ 2(3) and 14(a) merely give the
employer the option to keep his supervisors out of the union or allow them to join and when he
elects the latter course he bargains away his right to their loyalty. Id. at 55-56 (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
4 Id. at 17.
12d. at 16-19.
43394 U.S. 423 (1969).
"No. 71-1559, at 19, 54.
"Id. at 20.
"Id. at 54 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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supervisor membership in unions would be something less than that of
protected employees. 47
There is little question that Congress intended to prevent union
interference with management's right to designate its bargaining repre-
sentatives, 8 and it would be specious to suggest that, once selected, the
representatives permissibly could be hindered by union discipline in
performing the duties for which they were selected. On the other hand,
it is doubtful Congress intended to prohibit legitimate enforcement of
union rules simply because the disciplined member may be a supervisor
rather than a rank-and-file employee. Nevertheless, the legislative lan-
guage selected by Congress to implement the former intent has been
stretched by the Meat Cutters and IBEW court to the point that the
latter intent is imperiled.
While section 8(b)(1)(B) does act as a limitation upon union disci-
pline of supervisor members, whether it operates as an absolute bar is
not clear. The court in both Meat Cutters and IBEW stated that not
all supervisor discipline will be proscribed,49 but it gives no workable
guidelines with which to determine what discipline will be permitted.
The lone example cited by the court was a Board decision, Painters
Local 453,50 in which the NLRB found no violation of section 8(b)(1)(B)
where one local union fined a supervisor member of a sister local for
violating a rule that required members of sister locals to register with
the fining local when working in its jurisdiction. Clearly, failure to
register was conduct outside the managerial duties of the supervisor. It
can be argued, however, that the rule did interfere with his work as a
supervisor in the jurisdiction of the fining local and with management's
right to select him to work in that capacity.
Another question left unanswered by IBEW or Meat Cutters is
whether the nature of the conduct for which discipline was imposed is
the decisive factor in determining whether there has been a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(B). In IBEW the court held that the conduct need not
tSee note 18 supra. This language also negates the IBEW dissenting argument that any
employer who agrees to compulsory union membership for his supervisors gives up all rights to
their loyalty. See note 40 supra. If an employer need not recognize supervisors as employees for
the purpose of any collective bargaining law he certainly waives no rights in that respect under the
very terms of section 14(a).
"SSee I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 427 (1948);
2 Id. at 1012, 1077.
"'No. 71-1559, at 15 n.28; 458 F.2d at 798-99 n.12.
"183 N.L.R.B. 24 (1970).
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be in the actual application of a bargaining agreement provision or
adjustment of a particular grievance; the discipline is proscribed any
time "a supervisor is disciplined by a union because of the manner in
which he exercised his supervisory or managerial authority . . .-.
This language would seem to suggest that the intent of a union is impor-
tant and that a court should determine if a union intended to coerce
management by its action or merely intended to discipline a member.
The court later stated, however, that it is immaterial "'whether the
coercion succeeded or failed[;] . . . the test is whether the. . . conduct
.. .tend[ed] to interfere with . .. [the rights protected] under the
Act.' "12 Thus even unintentional interference is seemingly proscribed if
it has the requisite effect.
The controlling question appears to be whether the conduct the
union seeks to restrain is essential to the supervisory function, but, as
the dissent in IBEW pointed out, a supervisor, by the very nature of his
alignment with management in opposition to labor, can commit few acts
to which the union would object that would not be construed as the
performance of his managerial duties. 3
While IBEW held that it is not necessary that the conduct for which
a supervisor is disciplined be restricted to acts committed in the actual
administration of the bargaining agreement or adjustment of griev-
ances, it is not clear whether a supervisor must have authority to per-
form such duties. It is possible, though perhaps rare, for a supervisor
to administer matters not covered by the bargaining agreement and to
have no role in the grievance process. For example, a union-member
foreman might have unlimited authority to allocate over-time work
among employees, a subject not covered by the bargaining agreement.
He also might not serve a designated function in the grievance proce-
dure. May the union order him to allocate over-time according to a
particular union-determined formula and permissibly fine him for re-
fusal to do so, or is any conduct performed as a representative of man-
"No. 71-1559, at 14.
521d. at 24, quoting Mine Workers Local 167 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
uE.g., a supervisor may be required by management to cross picket lines; work during a strike
(indeed, perform the duties of the striking workers as in IBEW); seek out permanent replacements
for the striking workers; implement lockouts; campaign against the union during a representation
election, or resolve jurisdictional disputes in opposition to the union's jurisdictional claim. In short,
union discipline is generally imposed to sanction conduct in opposition to the union's interest, and
opposing the union comprises a substantial amount of the supervisory function.
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agement exempt from discipline so long as the actor is a supervisor? The
NLRB, in a recent decision,54 has taken the latter view, stating that
"[a]ll persons who are 'supervisors' within the meaning of Section
2(1 1)"5 of the Act are employer's 'representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances' within the purview
of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act ... ."I' This can be viewed as an
outright ban on discipline of supervisor members.
Neither Meat Cutters nor IBEW considered the situation of tempo-
rary supervisors. In some industries (most notably construction) an
employee member of the union may work as a supervisor for a short
period of time, or for only one project, and then return to non-
managerial status either temporarily or permanently. It can be argued
that if he is no longer a supervisor, he no longer has the protection of
section 8(b)(1)(B), even against discipline for acts committed while he
was in a supervisory status. If he is permanently returned to non-
supervisory status, it is difficult to see how such discipline could coerce
or restrain employers in any future selection of their representatives. On
the other hand, a temporary supervisor who knows that his fine will be
merely suspended until he returns to non-supervisory status will be re-
luctant to carry out management's directives.
What effect the limitation on discipline will have on continued
supervisor membership in unions is speculative. Unions may lose inter-
est in representing members they cannot discipline, or supervisors may
become more interested in the benefits of membership without the
hazards of discipline. The limitation should have some effect, however,
upon the negotiation of union-shop clauses covering supervisors in fu-
ture bargaining. Management's primary reasons for not agreeing to
such a clause, that it would allow union control over management repre-
sentatives, has been virtually eliminated and there is little reason for
resistance. The union, on the other hand, may seek the clause as a
valuable aid to the acquisition of membership, but could not insist upon
"Engineers Local 501, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 91.
-NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward,
or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment.
11199 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at -
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its inclusion under the interpretation of Typographers Local 38 v.
NLRB.57 Management negotiators will be able to condition agreement
to the benign clause only upon receipt of a valuable concession by the
union.
JOHN 0. POLLARD
Securities Regulation-The Reincarnation of the Deception Requirement
Rule lOb-5 1 has been used to develop a corpus of federal law relat-
ing to fiduciary obligations of directors, officers, and majority share-
holders2 in an area that has traditionally been a subject for state rather
than federal regulation.3 Due to its broad language, the rule creates an
almost undefined liability. Absent definitive legislative action, courts
have assumed primary responsibility for defining the extent of liability.
In the recent case of Popkin v. Bishop,' the Second Circuit clearly
rejected imposition of rule 1Ob-5 liability in the absence of an allegation
of nondisclosure or deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. This holding, reiterating nondisclosure as a fundamental
element in such an action, represents a significant restriction on the
expansion of rule lOb-5 into the area of corporate fiduciary obligations.
5 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. Attention should be called to the fact that
Typographers Local 38 was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. However, an opposite
decision in the near future seems unlikely.
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to [make a misleading
omission]. . . or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
'See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Entel
v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'Some commentators have expressed concern about this intrusion. Compare Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965), with Lohf, The
Corporation Law of the Securities Acts: Federal Rights of Corporations, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 76
(1963).
For a discussion of the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate management, see H. HENN,
CORPORATIONS §§ 235-41 (2d ed. 1970).
'464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Popkin, a shareholder of Bell Intercontinental Corporation,
brought a derivative action5 to enjoin the proposed corporate merger of
Bell and its two subsidiaries into the Equity Corporation, the majority
shareholder of Bell.6 Injunctive relief was sought on the ground that the
exchange ratios in the proposed merger agreement were unfair to the
minority shareholders of Bell and its subsidiaries as well as to the com-
panies themselves. Popkin alleged that by proposing those exchange
ratios, Equity and various officers and directors of Bell breached a
variety of fiduciary duties and that such breaches entitled him to relief
despite a complete disclosure of the merger terms. In affirming dis-
missal of the complaint, the Second Circuit held that in view of the
adequate disclosure, which is the principal federal interest served by rule
lOb-5, 7 the appropriate remedy of minority shareholders to test the
fairness of the merger terms is a suit for injunction in the state courts.8
Furthermore, the court reiterated that "non-disclosure [is] a key issue
in rule lOb-5 cases" and noted that plaintiff's "complaint contains no
allegation or hint of any misrepresentation . . . or of a failure . . . to
disclose any material fact in connection with the merger proposal."' The
basic problem thus presented in the case was whether rule lOb-5 is
violated when a breach of fiduciary duty is at issue in the sale or pur-
chase of stock 10 even though there has been full and fair disclosure of
the terms of the proposed merger.
'Although neither § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 nor the implementing rule
lOb-5 provides explicitly for a private remedy, such a right was implied early in the history of the
section. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court
recently noted that "[i]t is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)."
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
ABell owned 66% of the common stock of one of its subsidiaries and 81% of the other. Equity
Corporation controlled Bell and through Bell the two subsidiaries. 464 F.2d at 716.
'Id. at 720. The Supreme Court recently remarked that "the 1934 Act and its companion
legislative enactments embrace a 'fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclo-
sure for the philosophy of caveat emptor .... Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (footnote omitted).
8The court noted that the merger terms had been included in a judicially approved settlement
to other litigation and as a result a question of estoppel exists. However, serious doubt was
expressed that estoppel applies under the circumstances presented. 464 F.2d at 720-21.
1Id. at 718-19. Indeed, plaintiff conceded that a full and fair disclosure had been made. Id. at
718.
"OThe SEC originally took the position that an exchange of stock as a result of a merger did
not constitute a "sale." Since 1951, however, this position has been reversed. Mader v. Armel, 402
F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968). Under the theory of Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262
(7th Cir. 1967), a merger involving an exchange of stock is a "sale", thus allowing a lOb-5 action
either by the corporation or by its shareholders in a derivative capacity.
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A logical starting point in analyzing the relevance of rule lOb-5 to
an alleged breach of fiduciary obligation is the landmark decision of
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp." In that case the president and con-
trolling stockholder of Newport passed up a merger which would have
been beneficial to the minority stockholders and instead sold his stock
at a premium to another company. Plaintiffs' theory of injury was that
this sale of control stock at a premium, together with certain misrepre-
sentations made to them to facilitate the sale, constituted fraudulent
practices in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The
court, in denying relief to the plaintiffs2 concluded:
(1) that Section 10(b) was directed solely at that type of misrepresen-
tation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase or
sale of securities,
(2) that it extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller, and
(3) that it was not intended to provide a remedy for fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs. 3
While both the "usually associated with"" and the purchaser-seller"'
requirements enunciated in Birnbaum are significant isues in the area
of securities regulation, the third aspect of the opinion will be the focus
of this discussion.16
Although it is apparent that the Birnbaum court excluded fraudu-
lent mismanagement of corporate affairs from the scope of rule lOb-5,
it is by no means certain that other courts would likewise construe the
section. In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.7 the Third Circuit observed
by way of dictum that rule lOb-5 "imposes broad fiduciary duties on
1193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
"rhe Birnbaum defendants were subsequently held liable to the shareholders under state law
in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
11193 F.2d at 464.
"A significant erosion occurred in the case of A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967). In that case the court held that rule lOb-5 prohibits all fraudulent schemes in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities whether involving a unique form of deception or a "garden
variety" type. Id. at 397.
"For discussion of the standing problem, see generally Lowenfels, The Demise of The Birn-
baum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Develop.
ments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule J0b.5,
26 Bus. LAWYER 1289 (1971).
"See generally Lowenfels, Rule lob-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 893 (1965).
1292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
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management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders." 18
Subsequently, other courts have emphasized that the fact that a securi-
ties transaction was part of a broader scheme involving corporate mis-
management does not bar a rule lOb-5 action. As stated by the court in
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,19 the mere fact "that the fraud was
perpetrated by insiders does not render Section 10(b) inapplicable, if the
transaction represents an abuse of the securities trading process, and
should be properly subject to SEC regulation for an adequate rem-
edy."2 A contrary interpretation would import its own demise:
"[C]orporate officers and directors would possess an immunity from the
consequences of their fraud under. . . Rule lOb-5 which outsiders who
may have collaborated with them in defrauding the corporation would
not possess .... ,,21 Such an expansive reading of rule lOb-5 as enunci-
ated by the Pettit court encouraged further development in the applica-
tion of rule lOb-5 to management misconduct.
In 1964 the Second Circuit had before it the similar cases of Ruckle
v. Roto American Corp.22 and O'Neill v. Maytag2 but reached differ-
ent results. In Ruckle plaintiff's derivative claim alleged that the major-
ity directors, in authorizing issuance of shares to insiders at an inade-
quate price, withheld from the minority directors the latest financial
information relating to a proposed stock issue. In upholding plaintiffs
claim, the Second Circuit held that the majority directors' failure to
disclose material information to the minority directors constituted de-
ception upon the corporation. 24 In dictum Ruckle went further and
suggested that even full disclosure to all the directors does not necessar-
ily preclude rule lOb-5 liability. 25
In O'Neill the same court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
by the lower court. After observing that there was "[n]o serious claim
of deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact in this
"Id. at 834.
"1217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (stock issued for inadequate consideration and subsequently
distributed publicly).
2Id. at 25.
2"New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (corporate
officers acquired stock interests in properties in which their corporations were interested and
caused the corporation to purchase and sell its own and other stock at unfair prices).
22339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
"339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
21339 F.2d at 27.
2Id. at 29.
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case,"2 the court held that "where the duty allegedly breached is only
the general duty existing among corporate officers, directors, and share-
holders, no cause of action is stated under rule lOb-5 unless there is an
allegation of facts amounting to deception. 27 In O'Neill plaintiff had
charged that the directors set an exchange ratio that was detrimental
to the minority for the purpose of retaining control. It was alleged that
all board members were participants. Although seemingly falling within
the dictum of Ruckle, the O'Neill court distinguished Ruckle as involv-
ing "a clear allegation of deception"2 whereas no such allegation ex-
isted in O'Neill.9 The Ruckle dictum was later followed, however, by
the Third Circuit in a rule lOb-5 derivative suit in which the directors
were unanimous in defrauding the corporation." By viewing the minor-
ity shareholders as the defrauded corporate entity, the Third Circuit had
no difficulty in finding "deception."'"
In 1968 the "deception" requirement was further analzyed by the
Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook12 Plaintiff sued deriva-
tively, alleging that his corporation (Banff Oil, Ltd.) issued securities to
Aquitaine, a controlling corporation, and to an outsider at prices that,
because of undisclosed material information, did not represent the true
value of the shares. This issuance was allegedly part of a conspiracy to
defraud the remaining Banff stockholders. On these facts the Second
Circuit dismissed the complaint as to the outsider, but held that the
issuance of securities to Aquitaine presented a triable issue under rule
2339 F.2d at 767.
11Id. at 767-68.
"I1d. at 768.
2'One judge offered this explanation:
The only possible material difference I can perceive between Ruckle and O'Neill is
that in Ruckle there were directors who were not participants in the transaction and thus
could be deceived in the ordinary sense. In either case, however, the failure of the
defendant directors to perform their duty presumably injured the corporation, and I do
not believe it is sound to differentiate between situations where the directors were unani-
mous in wrongdoing and those where less than all were involved.
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.) (Fairchild, J., concurring), cert. deied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
0Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (defendant insiders sold shares to themselves
at an unfair price).
"Id. at 869.
32405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). For a detailed
analysis, see Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corpora-
tion Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1969).
[Vol. 51
DECEPTION REQUIREMENT
lOb-5.3 3 The allegedly improper exercise of a "controlling influence"
by Aquitaine over the Banff board of directors was itself within the
proscription of rule lOb-5:
If it is established that the transaction took place as alleged it consti-
tuted a violation of Rule lOb-5, subdivision (3) because Aquitaine
engaged in an "act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." Moreover, Aquitaine and the
directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff
(other than Aquitaine).34
If indeed Schoenbaum stands for the proposition that a violation of rule
lOb-5 is established upon the showing of an improper exercise of con-
trol, as suggested by at least one commentator, 3 then by eliminating
the traditional "fraud" or "deception" requirement, the Schoenbaum
decision gives impetus to the further broadening of federal law relating
to fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and majority shareholders.3 1
Thus the stage was set for clarification of the role of deception in
rule lOb-5 cases involving breaches of fiduciary duties. The Second
Circuit responded with the decision in Popkin v. Bishop.3 7 After observ-
ing that it had focused on improper self-dealing in Schoenbaum, the
Second Circuit nonetheless concluded that such emphasis "did not elim-
inate nondisclosure as a key issue in Rule lOb-5 cases. 138 The justifica-
tion for the emphasis was that since state law does not demand prior
shareholder approval in most situations involving self-dealing in securi-
ties transactions, full and fair disclsoure will rarely occur. Thus, "it
makes sense to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself
rather than on the 'failure to disclose' . . . ."I However, where merger
transactions are involved that require shareholder approval under state
law, the principal design of rule lOb-5 (imposing a duty of disclosure)
has special relevance. Indeed, it is apparent that this renewed emphasis
3'The critical difference appeared to be that Aquitaine could exercise controlling influence
over the board of directors.
11405 F.2d at 219-20.
3'Ruder, "Challenging Corporate Action Under Rule lOb-5", 25 Bus. LAWYER 75, 86 (1969).
"Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held that deception is not a necessary element of a lob-5
claim. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970),
"1464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
1Id. at 719. The decision is careful to point out that the court in Schoenbaum "suggested"
that self-dealing itself constituted a rule lOb-5 violation.
39Id.
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on disclosure only applies in those rare situations of self-dealing where
the law mandates prior shareholder approval. This, plus full and fair
disclosure (or concession thereof by plaintiff) will arise infrequently due
to the nature of corporate self-dealing. Accordingly, the court reasoned
that since Popkin "admitted that defendants fully and fairly disclosed
all material facts surrounding the merger to all interested parties, in-
cluding the minority shareholders,"40 the federal interest under rule lOb-
5 had been satisfied.4 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that where
the minority shareholders are powerless to prevent the merger, addi-
tional protection should be afforded them. The court noted that such
disclosed information placed them in a position to sue under state law
to enjoin the merger as unfair.4 Even should such action fail, the dis-
closed information would enable shareholders intelligently to exercise
their appraisal rights. One should note, however, that although ap-
praisal rights mitigate against the unfairness of such a merger by per-
mitting a minority shareholder to sell his shares for cash at a fair price,
an unfair merger forecloses a choice of retention of ownership in the
surviving corporation.
If the Popkin situation were held to be within the ambit of rule I Ob-
5 without the "disclosure" requirement, federal courts would in effect
be called upon to regulate many areas of internal management tradi-
tionally in the state realm. Such an intrusion would present the danger
of disruption of state policies on corporate management as well as a
possible conflict in standards of conduct. This factor becomes especially
acute when, as presently, state court decisions are redefining the fidu-
ciary duties of corporate directors and officers 43 and the responsibility
of majority shareholders to the minority shareholders. 4  Seen in this
'°Id. at 720.
"Injury to the corporation as a result of nondisclosure takes several forms: (1) it may permit
the defendants to position themselves so as to commit further mismanagement, Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); (2) it
may encourage mismanagement, Globus, Inc. t. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
(3) it may preclude others from seeking derivative relief, Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp.
766, 766 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum).
412464 F.2d at 720. Equity Corporation's ability, as majority shareholder, to accomplish the
merger with or without any other shareholder's approval could not by itself defeat a 10b-5 claim,
See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
One writer has suggested that many lOb-5 merger cases pose essentially a question of fairness.
Ruder, supra note 35, at 77-78.
"
2See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno,.24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
"See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
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perspective, Popkin's reincarnation of the "disclosure" limitation in rule
lOb-5 actions involving alleged breaches of fiduciary obligations seems
a salutary conclusion. On the other hand, a merger often involves self-
dealing and, because of the complexity of the transaction, "enhances the
opportunities for fraud and thus increases the need for antifraud protec-
tion."45
In view of the special provisions under rule lOb-5 for venue, " choice
of forum,47 and nationwide service of process" and the opportunity it
provides for escape from the state security-for-costs statutes in deriva-
tive suits49 and a more restrictive state substantive law,"0 it is apparent
why the scope of rule lOb-5 has been continuously tested in private
actions. But before expansion beyond the current precariously defined
limits, comprehensive congressional policy seems preferable to the pres-
ent ad hoc decisional approach supported by administrative rules."
WILLIAM L. HAIGH
"Argument of Commissioner's Counsel quoted in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262,
267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Due to inability to agree upon a position, the
SEC declined to file an amicus brief in Popkin. 464 F.2d at 719 n.15.
4815 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"See Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 747-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
s15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961).
"See generally Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-33 (1950).
"For discussion of a current attempt at codification of rule lOb-5, see generally Loss, The
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAWYER 27 (1969).
1973]

